Baker's Dozen

In general aviation the U. S. leads the world; it is superior in commercial aviation, its naval aviation is stronger than that of any other power, and with more financial support its Army aviation can be raised to a world position equal to that held by our Navy.

Thus last week did the special committee investigating the Army Air Corps sum up its conclusions based on three months of closed hearings in which 105 military, naval and civilian aviation experts appeared as witnesses. The twelve-man committee, headed by onetime Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker, published its findings in an 86-page report to Secretary of War Dern. Keynote of the report was a section in which the committee belittled the possibility of air invasion of the U. S.:

"To date no type of airplane has been developed capable of crossing the Atlantic or Pacific with an effective military load, attacking successfully our vital areas, and returning to its base. . . . The 'Air invasion of the U. S.' and the 'Air defense of the U. S.' are conceptions of those who fail to realize the inherent limitations of aviation and to consider ocean barriers." For the so-called Mitchell plan of unification of the Army & Navy air forces under a separate air department the committee had scant sympathy. Such a plan "would be a serious error, jeopardize the security of the Nation in an emergency, and be an unnecessary burden on the tax-payer."

Lone dissenter was James H. Doolittle, onetime Army Air Corps major, who in a one-man minority report wrote: "I am convinced that the required air force can be more rapidly organized, equipped and trained if it is completely separated from the Army and developed as an entirely separate arm." Failing this. "Jimmy" Doolittle urged that at least the Army Air Corps should be removed from control of the General Staff. To this a majority of the committee retorted: "The committee is not greatly impressed with the validity of the several imputations against the General Staff. Control is always repressive when misunderstood or inimical to personal interests."

Of the Air Corps' present strength: "The existing strength in personnel and airplanes is inadequate to meet the Army requirements of the national defense. There is faulty distribution and utilization of existing airplanes in that an undue proportion are rendered unavailable for combat training and fighting purposes."

For the shortage of men and equipment the committee blamed lack of funds and a niggardly Congress: ''The evidence . . . indicates clearly that the whole Army, as well as the Air Corps, is short of modern armament, equipment and transportation, as well as an adequate munition reserve." Nevertheless: "In military aviation . . . the U. S. stands second of the great powers insofar as total numbers of Army and Navy airplanes are concerned. . . . However, the fact is clear that . . . our Army combat aviation appears to have been allowed to fall below other leading aviation powers of the world in strength. . . . The fear that has been industriously cultivated in this country by various zealots that American aviation ... is inferior to that of the rest of the world as a whole is unfounded."

On the Army's airmail difficulties the committee delivered what will doubtless be the last and most authoritative word: "Army flyers trained for military missions could not be expected in the beginning to perform the duty of carrying the mail as efficiently as the experienced airmail pilots. The wholly unprecedented weather conditions in the early stages accentuated other difficulties. However, the Army flyers met this duty with fidelity which does them great credit as soldiers. After the initial period and the clearing of the weather the mail was carried with special credit to the Army Air Corps."

Statistics included in the report showed that out of 3,140 scheduled airmail trips, 1,187 were completed on schedule, bad weather accounting for delay in 446 cases. mechanical trouble in 39, accidents in only one.

That the Army's experience with the mail showed its major weakness to be in instrument flying the committee could not well deny: "Our military aviation has led the art [of flying] in all particulars except in the use of avigation and communication instruments. . . ." To make U. S. military aviation the world's finest, the committee had these major recommendations:

P: Construction of a 500-m.p.h. wind tunnel (see below) P: Increase of flying hours from 200 to 300 per Army pilot per year. P: Additional provision for training in night, instrument, radio beam and bad weather flying. P: A minimum of 2,320 airplanes for Army peacetime requirements. Present number: 1.500.* P: Development of a 1,000-h.p. liquid-cooled Diesel engine. P: Immediate organization of an independent "General Headquarters Air Force." composed of all tactical combat units of the Air Corps under a separate commander. P: An annual aircraft procurement program for Army & Navy with purchases by three methods: design competition, negotiated contract and competitive bidding. P: As a final recommendation the Baker committee suggested that its report be used as a basis for development of the Army Air Corps for the next ten years.

*--U. S. (Army & Navy) 2,500 France 3,000 Russia 3,000 Japan 2,500 Britain 1,400 Last week Great Britain announced it would build 500 more fighting planes by 1938.

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