How Far?

The spread of the war made it harder than ever for Vichyfrance to decide how far to commit itself to Germany's world ambitions. On the one hand were signs that Vichy might soon join the Axis:

> After Vice Premier Admiral Jean Frangois Darlan had met with Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano in Turin, it was rumored that Admiral Darlan had agreed to let the Axis use the French Tunisian port of Bizerte for Libyan reinforcements.

> British spokesmen said that French trucks, guns and tanks were already being used by Axis forces in Libya.

> Vichy's Governor of Indo-China, Admiral Jean Decoux, was not only smoothly accommodating Japan's occupation forces, but (before the U.S.-Japanese war) was even said to have asked the Japanese for military equipment.

> Swedish correspondents in Berlin reported that Germany expected Vichy to break with the U.S. over the U.S. seizure of French ships in American ports.

On the other hand were signs that Vichy might be reflecting that the Allies were growing too strong to warrant a total bet on Adolf Hitler. Vichy dared to protest when the Nazis announced that, in reprisal for attacks on German soldiers, they would fine the Jews of Occupied France a billion francs ($20,000,000), would execute 100 "Jews, Communists and anarchists."

Vichy officially reiterated its "neutrality," claimed its Fleet would be used only for "empire defense." Vichy also warned the U.S. to keep out of Martinique and French Guiana. Widespread French public opinion was probably reflected in a Journal des Debats editorial: "The conditions in which Japan struck the first blow prove that the decision to wage war was taken several days ago. As time passes the benefit of surprise action will doubtless diminish. Should the war prove long, America's potential will make itself felt."

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