Points for the Future

Messrs, Truman, Attlee and King abruptly outdated nearly everything that anybody else had to say about internationalizing The Bomb (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS). But, from Teheran to Potsdam, no major communique had turned out to mean all that it seemed to mean; hone of the great promises had been entirely fulfilled. The world debate would go on.

Some points for the future:

P: UNO was back on the map. The proposal to entrust control of all atomic energy to a UNO commission would, if carried out, give the United Nations Organization more power than was ever dreamed of at San Francisco--and more than UNO is yet equipped to handle.

P: The challenge to Russia was addressed to a government which had never publicly invited such a declaration, nor officially asked to share the U.S.'s atomic power. privately, Joe Stalin had made it clear to U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman that Big Power relations hinged on inter-Allied atomic policy.

P: World control of other weapons of mass destruction was on the conferees' minds. One such threat: bacteriological warfare. World War II advances in U.S., German, Russian, British laboratories made mass destruction by planned disease a very real possibility.

P: The declared intent to internationalize the atom "and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" did not end atomic nationalism. It strongly survived among President Truman's military advisers, who resumed their support of the highly nationalistic May-Johnson control bill. The British did not miss the point.

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