It's More Fun to Know

Luxemburg's plump, commonsensical Premier Pierre Dupong made a sensible remark about the Berlin crisis last week. Said he: "I don't want to find out if the Russians are willing to go to war. I would like to know, but I don't want to find out."

As both sides entered what was bound to become a new phase of East-West relations in Europe, the crisis crystallized the strengths and weaknesses of both. The Yalta-Potsdam comedy was played out. With or without another top-level conference between Russia and the Western powers, the old agreements, long since dishonored by the Communists, would be replaced by a more realistic pattern. What that pattern would be depended on how much strength, cooperation and purpose the Western nations could generate in the next few months.

That the West would have a few months in which to pull up its political socks became probable last week when General Lucius Clay declared that the Berlin Airlift could be expanded and continued indefinitely (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS). If it used the interval to apply the lessons it had learned from the Berlin crisis, the West would come to a conference with the Russians with little reason to fear a setback.

Any readjustment of Western policy would have to start with a clear understanding of what Russia was now trying to do in Europe. The Kremlin had two main objectives: 1) to wipe out or reduce U.S. power on the Continent, and 2) to stop Western Union. On objective No. 1 the Russians' Berlin crisis had backfired. By committing itself to the relief of Berlin the U.S. had committed itself more deeply than ever to the defense of Europe. The very vulnerability of the U.S. military position in Berlin taught the lesson of how necessary it was to have force on the spot. On their objective No. 2, however, the Russians had made some headway with the Berlin blockade.

When the Western Union nations met last week at The Hague (see below), they were frightened, divided and frustrated. Talk of impending war reminded them of how weak they were. This fear could be turned into an asset by the anti-Communist nations if it gave to Western Union a sense of urgency, if it could be quickly translated into a real political, military and economic program for a Western Union which would be far stronger than the sum of its parts.

Suppose, for example, that tomorrow the U.S., Britain and France should sit down with Russia to talk about the German problem. The U.S. would insist (rightly) that Germany must be rehabilitated for the sake of Europe. The Russians would promptly try to divide the West by playing on the French (and others') fear of a strong Germany. With Western Union in its present inert state, the Russians would probably succeed in this maneuver.

But next fall the Big Four might sit down under quite different circumstances. By then there might be a move toward a U.S. military guarantee of Western Union, starting with practical staff cooperation in an Atlantic defense system. Western Union might be moving rapidly on the political and economic fronts.

What it boiled down to was this: a weak and divided Western Europe must insist on a helpless Germany, and until Gerrnany recovers Western Europe cannot recover. A strong Western Europe can face (and include) a revived Germany. The first alternative means a Russian victory in the next phase of East-West relations; the second means a Western victory.

Whether the U.S. and the Russians sat down at a conference table would matter a lot less than whether the U.S. could, in the next few months, assume a bold leadership to get Western Union moving and to work out a German policy that would fit in with Western Union.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.