In the Shadow

After 20 years as China's leader, was Chiang Kai-shek on the way out? Last week Nationalist China's morale was so low that even some of the Gimo's sincere and patriotic supporters were asking the question.

"Now our gloom seems unshakable," said one high official. "Loss of confidence in the government is almost absolute. Everyone feels that he is in the shadow of imminent disaster. In the prevailing pessimism, people bicker and blame, but find no way out. They run to the government for personal favors, but never with wholehearted support. This is our danger. If we can't recover morale, if we can't regain popular confidence, then the government is lost indeed."

What could be done to repair China's shattered morale? Last week, in mountain-top Kuling, where he often goes in moments of his most earnest self-searching, the Gimo and his most trusted advisers tried to find answers. Some of the alternative courses which China might take:

P: The Gimo might stay on as head of state rallying what support he could for a stand in Central and South China against the Communists.

P: The Gimo might step down, giving way to the new brooms of a "reform" government (most likely head: Vice President Li Tsung-jen).

P: China might splinter into regional commands.

P: The Communists might conquer all of China.

Men Mentioned. Communist political strategy, exploiting the widespread yearning for peace, played up the possibility of peace talks. But with the summer's military successes, the Communists' peace price has gone up. One Nationalist official quoted a pertinent old proverb: Neng chan neng ho--Only he who can fight can make peace. The men around Chiang, even Vice President Li, an outspoken critic of the Gimo, were too staunchly anti-Communist to let China be swallowed by the Reds.

Another man mentioned as possible successor to Chiang was Defense Minister Ho Ying-chin, who leads the Whampoa Military Academy clique. If, as seems likely, the Gimo had a hand in picking his successor, he would probably prefer Ho to Li.

A less likely possibility is Fu Tso-yi, energetic and relatively successful commander in the northwest. Fu is not a member of the Whampoa group but would probably be more acceptable to it than would Li. Fu and Li are both members of the Tsa-Pai (mixed label) group.

Localized Zigzags. Li, Ho or Fu (or any other successor to Chiang) would have great difficulty uniting the Kuomintang behind him. The mere mention of their names brought closer the prospect of regionalism. A trend toward decentralization has already set in, partly because the Gimo has had to rely on trusted local commanders in remote areas to equip and organize their own commands. In North China, local authorities have been buying arms for militia forces independent of the Central government, and the use of silver dollars (banned by the Central government in 1935) has spread. In Manchuria, General Wei Li-huang has recruited, equipped and trained four new divisions. Without the Ginio at the head of the government, the splintering process would be speeded up. Divided, the Nationalist military leaders would be easier pickings for the Reds.

With or without the Gimo as head of Nationalist China, with or without a lapse into regionalism, the Communists knew that it would be hard to conquer all of China. "The Chinese revolution," broadcast China's Communist radio recently, ". . . can only be won step by step . . . The Chinese people must prepare for several years of continued hard struggle . . . Certain temporary localized respites or zigzags may occur in the course of the struggle."

Tiger's Hide. After the Ruling talks, the Gimo might decide to hang on. No other anti-Communist leader had the prestige and power to form a government that could both hold China together and stand against Red pressure. But the Gimo carried to Kuling echoes of renewed demands, from party members who had met in Nanking, for reform in his Kuomintang party. Said one: "The party has so deteriorated that it no longer is a weapon but an obstacle in suppression of Communism." Gloomed Shanghai's daily Sin Wen Pao at meeting's end: "Most party officials who are talking about reform should themselves be objects of reform. To expect them to carry out reform may be like asking the tiger for his hide."

To rally really enthusiastic support from demoralized Chinese, the Gimo's reforms would have to be far-reaching. In the end, he might decide to sweat it out without upsetting the organized backing he now has. Some Nationalists thought that his government could hang on, even without increased U.S. aid, for two more years. Their policy would be retreat, ending eventually in South China, perhaps with headquarters at Canton. During those two years, decisive events outside China might lead to its rescue, as happened in China's long war with Japan.

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