"We Believed in Our Hearts"

The fact that Franklin Roosevelt made concessions to Russia at Yalta is well known. Last week in Collier's, Roosevelt's old and loyal friend, Playwright Robert E. Sherwood,* threw some light on the method and manner in which those concessions were made--particularly the deal made at the expense of China.

"Tentative Arrangements." At Yalta, Sherwood reminded his readers, F.D.R. was doing his utmost to enlist Russia's aid in the war against Japan (the atom bomb had not been finally developed). Stalin laid down his terms. In addition to Japanese-mandated southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, Stalin wanted title to the Chinese ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, use of the Manchurian railways. Otherwise Stalin did not see how he could ever explain to his people why Russia was going to war against Japan.

Roosevelt thought it could be arranged. On the question of whether Roosevelt had discussed any of these matters with Chiang Kaishek, Sherwood is confusing; he first reports yes on Dairen, later no. At any rate, the conferees discussed whether Chiang Kai-shek should be told.

Sherwood reports: "Roosevelt said he felt that one of the difficulties of speaking the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in 24 hours. Stalin agreed and said he did not think it was necessary to speak to the Chinese of these arrangements at this time." Stalin would first like to complete the movement of 25 divisions to the Siberian-Manchurian frontier. "Stalin said that the tentative arrangements concerning the Far East should be put in writing and this was accordingly done . . ."

"Dawn of a New Day." Roosevelt asked whether Stalin wished to take these matters up with China's then Foreign Minister T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow, or whether Stalin would prefer that Roosevelt take them up with the

Generalissimo. Stalin replied that "he would prefer to have the President do it."

Stalin said he would let Roosevelt know when F.D.R. should break the news to Chiang Kaishek. "Roosevelt said that he would send an Army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with instructions to Ambassador Hurley, in order to insure secrecy."

Conversation also turned to the problem of keeping China alive. Wrote Sherwood: "Stalin felt that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek . . . The President said the fault lay more with the Chungking government than with the so-called Communists."

Said Hopkins of Yalta (according to Sherwood): "We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and far-seeing."*

In LIFE last week, William C. Bullitt, ex-ambassador to Russia and France, wrote a searing indictment of Roosevelt's Russian policy from 1941 on. It was a misguided policy, said Bullitt, of trying to handle Stalin by giving him all he asked, by repaying Stalin's arrogance and intransigence with friendliness and good will.

Bullitt tried to convince Roosevelt that Stalin was a Caucasian bandit and a Communist to boot who believed in the Communist conquest of the world. But Roosevelt (according to Bullitt) replied: "Bill, I don't dispute the logic of your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man. Harry [Hopkins] says he's not and that he doesn't want anything but security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace . . . It is my responsibility and not yours and I'm going to play my hunch."

* In the next-to-last installment of a 12-part series, The Secret Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, which Sherwood wrote after sifting through 40 crates of Hopkins' notes. Actually, Hokins was too sick to make many notes on the Yalta meeting. Sherwood filled in the gaps by interviews with men to whom Hopkins had talked afterwards.

* Because of his illness, Hopkins was flown back to the U.S. after Yalta. Roosevelt was disap pointed and displeased that he would not be with him aboard the cruiser Quincy to help write the speech which he was preparing for Congress. "When Hopkins left the Quincy at Algiers," Sherwood wrote, "the President's 'goodbye' to him was not a very amiable one -- a circumstance which it is sad to record, for Hopkins never saw his great friend again."

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