HOW CLOSE IS WAR ?

This week, as the Moscow-Berlin-Paris negotiations over the German crisis sputtered to a horrifying stop, men & women everywhere shared a common question: How close is war?

In map rooms, boardrooms, classrooms, barrooms, the question was asked a million times. Britain, which has recently looked upon the U.S. as somewhat hysterical about the danger of war, was swept by a wave of alarm--but not of panic. The London Daily Mirror reported the British people as "calmly bewildered and apprehensively steady." The phrase was very British, but it described the attitude of the Western world in general. The West was braced for a blow--and it wanted desperately to know whether the blow was likely to come soon, or whether it might be postponed a year, or ten, or more.

No man alive--not even Stalin--knew the answer. No one had a grip on all the main factors in the equation. Some men, however, knew much more than others; and some answers were much better than others. Last week a survey of the best sources of information in the non-Communist world yielded some hard facts, some pertinent speculation and some cautious conclusions about the chances of war.

Just for Defense? The U.S. has no persuasive direct evidence that Russia is preparing an immediate military attack. The Red Army has at least 14 divisions in Eastern Germany--a formidable force compared to the U.S., British and continental troops facing them. There is, however, little evidence that the Russians have been building up their garrison in Germany or preparing it to strike. Some evidence exists of increasing Russian military concentration much farther east, between Kiev and the Rumanian border. This might be preparation for an attack. On the other hand, it might be a Russian defensive measure, springing from the Kremlin's uneasiness over the uneasy satellite countries on Russia's border.

The intelligence services of Western nations were certain that Russia, although it had the larger ground force, would be militarily much weaker than an armed U.S. The Russians have not got the atomic bomb. The Russian economic machine has made no recent important strides on the very long way it would have to go to approach equality with the U.S. Nevertheless, Russia s defensive capacity is impressive. If attacked, Russia would defend itself stubbornly.

As to the near side of the fence, some equally certain statements can be made. The U.S. and its allies are not mounting an attack on Russia. They too are trying to strengthen their defenses and they have concentrated in Britain a bomber force capable of striking a very hard, retaliatory, atomic blow if the Red Army moves against the West.

Communists profess to believe that a group of "capitalists and militarists" who dominate U.S. policy want war. Henry Wallace repeats this dangerous lie. Even a few British officials believe that the U.S. Government leans toward the idea of a "preventive war" in the near future, before Russia gains in relative strength.

A group in favor of preventive war does exist in the U.S. Government and the U.S. public. It is largely made up of people who could be described as disillusioned idealists; in their past fatuity, they had put too much trust in Russia or in the U.N.; in their present disappointment they want to "get it over with" by attacking Russia. But this small and scattered group has little influence on either the Government or the nation. It does not include a single top level official, civilian or military, in the present Administration, or any man likely to become a high official in a Dewey Administration

The gist of these certain facts boils down to this: 1) the West has no intention of starting a war, preventive or otherwise; 2) the West has no clear proof, or even strong indication, that the Russians are about to attack, and 3) either side, if attacked, will fight back.

These certainties, however, cover only a very tiny part ot the whole picture. Most of the answers to the question of war's closeness have to be calculated in terms of the probable, the possible and even the fantastic.

Just Berlin? The worst piece of analysis which last weekend's crisis brought to the surface came from a French government official. A reporter who asked him for his view of the Berlin issue cabled the following account of the Frenchman's reply:

"You see, Berlin is the only bad point today in our relations with Russia. You remember the pressure on Turkey, then on Iran; then there was the Greek danger. Well, all that is gone now; only Berlin remains. For my part, I feel that if we can solve this question without . . ." (here a pause of some seconds and the merest suggestion of a shudder) "without . . . anything unpleasant . . . then, then ..." (another, slightly longer pause and an expression of the eyes such as might be brought by only a beautiful memory or a lovely hope) "then . . . well, I don't say for centuries, not centuries necessarily, but for a very long time indeed, the Western powers and Russia may live without disturbance beside one another ... Of course, "this sort of arrangement would not be pleasant for the Poles and the Czechs, but . . ." (now the gesture suggests a delicate, gentlemanly shrug) "well, I think we could have peace for a long time. Just Berlin--that's all that stands in the way. That is why we are so anxious to solve this one remaining question .. . . just Berlin."

This well-intentioned nincompoop obviously thought that

war was just around the corner, but that it could be pushed

"into the very remote future by a single act of renunciation on

the part of the West. He was concentrating on a tree--Berlin-- and ignoring a whole forest of issues to which the Russians could (and, on form, would) turn the day after they had cut down the Western position in Berlin. A Western retreat from

Berlin would not bring immediate war, but it would invite a further Russian advance in Germany which would be harder to resist because the Berlin concession had been made. At some point along this road, the West would probably turn and stand its ground, as Neville Chamberlain turned and stood on the issue of the invasion of Poland.

Powder Kegs & Lollipops. No worthwhile estimate of the chances of war can be made (as the Frenchman made his) on the basis of an isolated issue, whether it be Hitler's drive for Poland or Stalin's for Berlin. Great nations are not powder kegs exploding into war at the drop of a carelessly tossed diplomatic demarche. Nor are they children, to be pacified by a conciliatory lollipop. Situations ripe for war find the specific issues (sometimes quite trivial ones, like Sarajevo) that start the shooting. Situations not ripe for war ignore specific issues (sometimes very serious ones, like Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland).

From Waterloo to 1914 there were a score of issues over which France and Britain might have fought. They were old enemies and current imperial rivals. Yet they did not fight: the French had little chance against British sea power; the British had little interest in destroying the French check on Austrian and Prussian land power. Britain and France were not "ripe" for war.

Is the conflict between the U.S. and Russia ripe today?

The simplest, deadliest kind of war ripeness occurs when two nations, having conflicting aims which each considers vital, arrive at a point of strength where each believes it can beat the other, and that it has more chance of winning if the war is not postponed.

There is no doubt that the U.S. and the Kremlin consider that they have conflicting vital interests. The Communists have always believed (and almost always said) that their mission is worldwide victory for their system; and that their own survival could not be assured in a world partly nonCommunist. Since the U.S. began to understand, about two years ago, that the Communists actually believed this, the U.S. has recognized its essential conflict with Russia.

What about their relative strength? In the tangible, measurable factors with which military men deal, the U.S., plus its allies, would be clearly much stronger than Russia plus its allies. There are, however, imponderables in the equation. A Communist in a Chinese radio station might think up a political slogan worth six aircraft carriers or a large steel plant. The relative superiority of the U.S., while certain by military standards, is only probable by overall strategic standards. A sane Communist could conclude that Russia's strength equals or surpasses that of the U.S.

He could, of course, be wrong, as the Kaiser and Hitler and Tojo were wrong. Who will win a war is determined by real strength, but whether a war will start is determined largely by estimates of strength, which may be right or wrong.

When the U.S. tries to guess at how the Kremlin estimates U.S. strength, it is obviously dealing with the probable, the possible and the fantastic. Who, for instance, can say what effect the police state mentality has on honest strategic information? Do they tell Stalin what he wants to hear? Or do they tell him the truth?

Even in this murky area of speculation there are some signposts. Stalin does not seem to be an egomaniac, like Hitler. His career has been notable for caution. On a number of issues the soviet government has reacted to U.S. firmness in a way that indicates its respect for U.S. strength; it has behaved in general as if it were not seeking immediate war. The balance of evidence seems to indicate that the Kremlin estimate of relative U.S. v. Russian strength is about the same as the U.S. calculation. If the Russians do consider the U.S. clearly stronger, then the chances of immediate war probably are not great.

X or Y or Z? If there is any argument in Russia's Politburo (and there probably is) about relative U.S.-Russian strength, that argument is bound to lead into another: Is Communism growing at the expense of antiCommunism, or vice versa? If Politburo Member X believes that the U.S. is now stronger than Russia, but that in the future U.S. strength will decline while Russia's rises, he would logically be against war now. If Politburo Member Y believes Russia stronger than the U.S. now, but destined to decline in relative strength, he would logically be in favor of war now.

For all the West knows, the balance is held by Politburo Member Z, who believes that strength is roughly equal now. To Z any sign that the West is declining is an argument for postponing war until it declines further; any sign that it is rising is reason for fighting now.

The prevailing view in Washington is that Kremlin policy is controlled by those who think like Politburo Member X. A small minority (which contains some very shrewd men) believes that Comrade Z has the floor in Moscow. If this minority is right, then U.S. rearmament and the success of the Marshall Plan might bring war closer. Nevertheless, this minority group favors rearmament and the Marshall Plan, not because it wants war, but because it fears a Communist sweep across the world unless anti-Communist resistance is stiffened.

There is not much objective evidence that Kremlin policy is dominated by the now-or-never school. The Communists made an energetic and brilliant bid for the domination of Europe, but they did not spend or risk much in the bidding. Their electoral drives for France and Italy cost the Kremlin very little; their defeat leaves them in a position to try again at the first sign of Western weakness--and try they will.

In Asia, Red success has probably outrun Kremlin expectations. They are a long way from control of Asia, but they have helped to alienate most of it from the West. Already this success is paying Red dividends in denying to Europe a large part of normal trade with Asia.

World Communism has recently lost ground in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe; but it is not a cornered rat, and there is little reason to suppose that it will act like one. If Marx, Lenin and Stalin are right (and a Communist is conditioned to believe they are), the West is bound to decline. The role of the Communist, as he sees it, is to speed that decline. Of all the ways that it can be done, war is the riskiest. It is significant (although certainly not conclusive) that the U.S.S.R. did not attack either Germany or Japan during the years when both were preparing to attack her.

Permanent Crisis. From these facts, inferences and guesses, some conclusions, mostly tentative, can be drawn. Among them:

1) The U.S. does not want war now. (Certain.)

2) The U.S. will fight against a Russian military advance almost anywhere, including Berlin, beyond the area now Soviet-controlled. (Highly probable.)

3) The U.S. would be much slower to react militarily against Russian political gains. (Highly probable.)

4) The U.S.S.R. does not want war now. (Probable.)

5) The U.S.S.R. will continue to press hard against soft spots in the anti-Communist front. (Highly probable.)

6) The danger of war decreases as Western strength grows, increases as it declines. (Probable.)

7) War this year is a real possibility, but is not probable.

8) Continued disturbance of the "peace" is almost certain.' As one high U.S. official put it last week: "The crisis is permanent, and the American people will just have to get used to it."

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