The State of the Union

The nation, its allies, and the black backdrop of Communism were all the same. But the President of the U.S., who came before a joint session of Congress this week to deliver his message on the State of the Union, was different. Before Dwight Eisenhower had flipped four pages of his looseleaf notebook, the difference came clear. It was a new grasp of the nature of the challenge before the U.S., and in the grasp the problems themselves seemed less awesome.

The change had been wrought in the first fortnight of the new Administration, and the President's speech proved how fundamental it was. To listeners in the House chamber and before the nation's television screens, Ike came through as a man who matched the challenges. He spoke with a sparing eloquence, his every intonation and shake of the head tuned to the meaning of his words. This was more than forensic skill; his speech was public evidence of an organizational and administrative talent which had already made Eisenhower the master of his job.

Close Pattern. He moved with easy familiarity through the vast areas of Government, from war to the conservation of river valleys, from taxes to segregation--specifying where new executive policy was required, where legislative action was needed, where he would launch new fact-finding surveys and studies before making changes. The pattern hung together because Ike knew that no essential program could succeed until, first of all. the U.S. righted its own approach to foreign policy.

"We have learned," said the President, "that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension. To do so leaves forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself. This Administration has, therefore, begun the definition of a new, positive foreign policy . . . governed by certain basic ideas." In enumerating the basic ideas, the President did some important fixing of old policy failures. Along the way he:

P: Recognized for Asia an importance equal to Europe in development of a "coherent global policy."

P: Repudiated any & all secret commitments ("I shall ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution . . .") which Democratic administrations may have made with governments which permit "enslavement"--e.g., the Yalta Agreement.

P: Promised aid only "in the measure that [other nations] strive earnestly to do their full share of the common task . . ."

P: Reminded Western Europe, with the easy brusqueness of an old friend, that "the problem of security demands closer cooperation . . . than has been known to date"--an endorsement of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' sharp prodding of the laggard European Defense Community (see below).

P: Asked Congress to recognize "the importance of profitable and equitable world trade" by 1) extending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 2) revising the cumbersome customs regulations, 3) en couraging a "hospitable climate" for U.S. private investment abroad.

Then the President turned to reassess the Korean war. He ignored the happy delusion that the Korean war, of itself, is somehow a "lesson" which has taught Communists the folly of aggression. Said he: "It is clearly a part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing in Indo-China and in Malaya, and of the strategic situation that manifestly embraces the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there." With the war thus redefined, his next step was easy.

Defensive Arm. "In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea," he said, "the U.S. Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations [by the Chinese Nationalists] against the Chinese Communist mainland. This has meant, in effect, that the U.S. Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China ... There is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the U.S. Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. This permitted those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

"I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make crystal clear--this order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea."

He wasted no hand-wringing on fears that his Formosa action might bring a larger war. "There is but one sure way to avoid total war," said he, "and that is to win the cold war." By implication he acknowledged that the U.S. would have to take risks, no matter what its policies. "While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent to a would-be aggressor, another powerful deterrent is defensive power, [and] total defensive strength must include civil-defense preparedness. Because we have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons, this kind of protection becomes sheer necessity."

The Menace of Momentum. Still in the framework set by foreign policy, the President moved easily to the "inescapable need for economic health and strength if we are to maintain adequate military power and exert leadership for peace in the world." The ultimate economic aims are still a balanced budget, a reduction of taxes, and a checkrein on "the menace of inflation." But "the momentum of past programs' (i.e., Harry Truman's commitments) will delay tax reduction until "we can succeed in bringing the budget under control" (unlikely in 1954).

Meanwhile, he went on, much can be done to restore the climate of enterprise. Proposed moves:

P: Develop a tax system "which will impose the least possible obstacle to the dynamic growth of the country . . . particularly . . . small businesses."

P: Get the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board (which feuded disastrously under Harry Truman) to work jointly on a plan to stabilize the economy.

P: Let wage and price controls expire next April 30. and let material and product controls (except for scarce defense items) expire on June 30. But Ike recommended temporary continuance of federal rent control in the "socalled defense areas."

Many of the policies which the President ticked off would be handled in the province of the executive. Some he promised to handle in obvious hope that Congress and Congressmen would let him alone--e.g., he made it clear that he intends to pursue his own loyalty program, hoping to avoid "policing by another branch of Government" which might create "disorder and confusion." He also had a few specific legislative recommendations for Congress to consider. Among others, he recommended:

P: Statehood for Hawaii in time for the 1954 election (but no mention of Alaska).

P: Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act so that it "merits the respect and support of both labor and management."

P: Enactment of a new immigration law to replace the McCarran Act.

P: Extension of social security coverage to "millions of citizens who have been left out of the social security system."

"There is, in world affairs," said the President toward the end of his 56-minute-long speech, "a steady course to be followed between an assertion of strength that is truculent and a confession of helplessness'that is cowardly. There is, in our affairs at home, a middle way between untrammeled freedom of the individual and the demands for the welfare of the whole nation ... In every area of political action, free men must think before they can expect to win. In this spirit must we live and labor [and] turn to the great tasks before us."

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