The Standpatter

The U.N. was trapped between an enemy who was willing to settle and a principal ally who saw the settlement as ruinous. At Panmunjom, the Communists were presumably all set to sign an armistice. But in Seoul, stubborn old Syngman Rhee postponed a cease-fire indefinitely by setting free 27,000 North Korean war prisoners that the U.N. had promised to turn over to a neutral commission (see below). By his act, Syngman Rhee all but solved the problem of forced repatriation so far as North Koreans were concerned. He certainly proved that they did not want to go back. But he also struck a heavy blow at U.N. hopes for an end to the war. The talks at Panmunjom came to a halt.

In releasing the prisoners, Rhee violated the agreement that placed his troops under the U.N. Command in 1950. He also broke repeated promises to General Mark Clark and U.S. Ambassador Ellis Briggs that he would take no "unilateral action with reference to ROK forces . . . until after full and frank discussion" with Clark. Said an angry U.S. soldier: "We came over here to help him, and now he's kicked us in the face." Said Mark Clark: a "precipitous and shocking action."

But Syngman Rhee did only what he had warned he would do. The U.N. Command, and the rest of the world, had long regarded Rhee as an obstreperous but powerless old man who might threaten but would be brought to heel. Now an awful realization dawned: maybe the old man meant what he said. For Rhee, the release of the prisoners was entirely consistent. In more than half a century of fighting for a free and united Korea, he had made it clear by his acts that he was prepared for anything, from torture to an open break with his allies of 1953.

Pertinent Questions. Had Rhee killed all chances for a truce? One sign that some sort of cease-fire might still be possible came from Red Commanders Kim II Sung and Peng Teh-huai. In a surprisingly mild letter to Mark Clark, Kim and Peng accused the U.S. of "conniving" with Rhee to release the prisoners, but did not even threaten to break off the talks. Instead, they asked General Clark some pertinent, practical questions:

"Is the U.N. Command able to control the South Korean government and army?

"If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique?

"If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea?"

These were exactly the questions that Mark Clark had to ask himself. Even if the Communists want peace badly enough to overlook the prisoner release, there will be no armistice until the U.N. Command can answer the Red questions. Rhee vowing not to settle for anything short of a unified Korea, could use his prodigious political and police power to upset any armistice, even if the ROK army should obey the U.N. instead of its President--which last week seemed entirely unlikely. Said a U.S. official in Seoul last week: "Rhee is a radical revolutionary. His actions prove that we just can't try to predict what he is going to do in terms of what is sensible. He has proved that he is capable of going to any end to get what he wants." Not all Koreans felt the same way. This week Chough Pyung Ok, leader of the only permitted opposition party, spoke out: "We cannot march north on our sentiments . . . Intelligent people in Korea know we are unprepared for such an undertaking." Chough's voice, however, is weak.

In its odd predicament, the U.N. Command this week seemed to have but four courses to follow. The U.N. could:

P: Give in to Rhee, adopt his demands at Panmunjom, and then be prepared to continue the stalemated war or seek a mili tary decision when the Reds turn down the demands.

P: Sign a separate peace with the Reds, disclaim responsibility for South Korea and get out as quickly as possible.

P: Put down Syngman Rhee by declaring U.N. martial law, placing Rhee in "protective custody" or engineering a coup d'etat to bring to power a Korean who would cooperate with the U.N.

P: Continue trying to persuade Rhee while going ahead with a truce, hoping for the best.

The first two possibilities were abhorrent and so was the third, which would involve vast military risks (e.g., a collapse of the ROK army, which has been doing most of the fighting these days). Furthermore, time was rapidly slipping by for the third: already Rhee has decided to fire the ROK army's young (33) Chief of Staff, Paik Sun Yup, who is a U.N. favorite.

Although there was nothing in Rhee's conduct to indicate that he was bluffing, the U.S. chose the easy fourth course, and hopefully assumed that Rhee would come around in the end. To Korea this week flew Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, a personal emissary from Dwight Eisenhower, with orders to talk to Rhee. Just how Robertson, a neophyte in power politics, or his companion, Assistant Secretary of State Carl McCardle, were to persuade shrewd, sly, dedicated old Syngman Rhee to abandon his lifelong dream was not explained. One weapon at hand: a threat to cut off economic aid should Rhee continue to thwart an armistice.

Caught between the Communists and Rhee the U.N. Command faltered in in decision. The editor of one of Rhee's tightly controlled newspapers told an American correspondent: "From now on the Korean government is going to run the war. The Americans can do nothing to stop it. They must do whatever we want them to do and they know it." It was a chilling statement. It even contained a certain amount of truth.

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