The Bomb & the Ban

Throughout most of the cold war, the U.S. has argued for a policy of effective world disarmament, enforced by a system of international inspection. For the past 17 months at Geneva, the U.S. has been trying to pursue that policy by negotiating a ban on explosive nuclear testing. Progress has been slow and painful. The Soviets wanted to halt all tests first, then talk about inspection. The U.S. voluntarily quit testing, but held firmly that agreement on inspection must precede any permanent ban.

Last February the U.S. offered a new plan that went about as far as the nation could go under President Eisenhower's long-standing declaration that the U.S. would accept only a ban that could be checked. The new U.S. plan would outlaw all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in the sea, in space--and police the ban with a global network of long-range seismographs, plus international teams of inspectors to probe any suspicious earth tremors on the spot. But the U.S. would exempt all underground tests of less than 19 kilotons (about one Hiroshima bomb), because they are nearly impossible to detect.

The Soviet Plan. The Soviets at first damned the plan. "A conspiracy," said Soviet Delegate Semyon Tsarapkin. "It is unacceptable, of course." But a fortnight ago Tsarapkin came back with a counterplan that carried the ring of compromise. He accepted the U.S. suggestion to ban the big, controllable tests. In addition, he suggested that all powers "voluntarily ban, for 'four or five years,'" the low-yield underground tests that could not be monitored. Meanwhile, the Soviets would support the U.S. call for an all-out drive to develop seismic methods to detect such elusive blasts. For all its pitfalls, the bid seemed to contain two Soviet concessions: that small tests would not have to be banned permanently, and an admission that the control system needs to be improved.

U.S. policymakers faced an obvious dilemma. Should they enter into a gentle-man's-agreement treaty very short of the "assured-controls" treaty that they had long proclaimed was the bare minimum?

To think out a U.S. reply to the Russians, Secretary of State Christian Herter last week convened the Administration's "Committee of Principals": Atomic Energy Commission Chairman John McCone, Central Intelligence Agency Chief Allen Dulles, Air Secretary James Douglas (sitting in for Defense Secretary Thomas Gates Jr., who was in Europe for a NATO meeting), and Presidential Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky. None was willing to accept all the Soviet points. Otherwise, the group was split. Herter and Kistiakowsky were for negotiating further on inspection guarantees, but talked of making some concessions to reach an agreement. AEC Chairman McCone called for a prompt resumption of testing until enforceable controls were assured. The Pentagon strongly seconds him.

The Case For. Those who leaned toward accepting the Soviet bid--with conditions--argued that the ultimate decision should hinge less on military-scientific grounds than political-diplomatic grounds. They admitted, as one Government scientist said, that "the Russian proposal is not very attractive as it stands." But even scientists were now admitting that a "perfect" control system would be impossible. The let's-try-it group argued that the Soviets would not dare risk the grave world political consequences of being caught cheating.

Furthermore, they said the U.S. would be wise to accept the Soviet plan for a year or two, because even the best of systems would require a year or two to install adequate control stations. And in the next few years, scientists might actually develop foolproof detectors, or the Soviets might give a bit more on inspection. Most important, the Soviets had apparently accepted the principle of inspection (albeit with precious few specifics), and inspection is the starting point for any realistic system of disarmament. By making this start--at an admitted risk--the U.S., they held, would win respect among the uncommitted nations as a true champion of disarmament and peace.

The Case Against. Opponents of acceptance stood on firm technical and military grounds. They argued that a ban would freeze nuclear development at its current pioneering stage. It wo.uld stymie such peaceful nuclear pursuits as atom-powered space probes and massive use of atomic explosives to blast a new Alaskan harbor. It would make more difficult the already difficult job of keeping together skilled teams of scientists in AEC labs. It would stall the development of clean, small, highly mobile tactical weapons.

Above all, it would delay the correction of the missile gap, because it would all but stop the U.S. development of nuclear warheads light enough to tip its second generation of solid-fuel missiles such as the Minuteman, Polaris and Nike-Zeus. (The Minuteman's warhead, for example, has never been tested.)

The Western Decision. Into this atmosphere at week's end came British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, arriving in Washington aboard a Royal Air Force Comet. Macmillan, who favors the Soviet bid, contended that the long-drawn Geneva talks had raised such high hopes around the world that to resume testing would amount to propaganda suicide. If the West were to reject the Soviet compromise, it would have forfeited the opportunity to hold the Kremlin to a controllable ban on atmospheric tests and large underground explosions.

President Eisenhower made the final decision. It was, as Columnist James Reston wrote, "the most serious decision he has had to make since he ordered the Allied troops to cross the English Channel for the invasion of Europe in 1945."

The U.S., Ike decided, would accede to a full ban for a year or two, provided that the Soviets would genuinely press for a crash drive to devise better detection, and would make further concessions on issues of inspection.

The word in Washington was that the

U.S. will test no more nuclear deterrent weapons while Dwight Eisenhower is still in the White House, even if negotiations bog down. The testing moratorium has run 17 long months already. Ike is not likely to break it before the summit conference in May, his mission to Moscow in June, the political conventions in July, or during the campaign months.

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