Battle of the Islands

By the time the third round of the television debates went on the air--with Vice President Richard Nixon speaking from Los Angeles and Senator John Kennedy from Manhattan--both candidates were tightlipped. Through the week they had been lobbing charges at each other on the Quemoy-Matsu question stirred up in Debate No. 2. In Albuquerque, Nixon warned that Kennedy's proposed abandonment of the two Chinese offshore islands would be "the road to war, the road to surrender. We must not give up an inch of territory." At Knott's Berry Farm, near Long Beach, Calif., he added: "We left the policy of retreat and defeat behind us in 1953, and we're not going back to it in 1960." Kennedy delivered a full-dress speech to a Democratic dinner at Manhattan's Waldorf-Astoria. Said he: "I will not risk American lives and a nuclear war by permitting any other nation to drag us into the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time through an unwise commitment that is unsound militarily, unnecessary to our security and unsupported by our allies." He topped it off by warning against "a trigger-happy President in the White House."

In the final minutes before the TV debate began, Kennedy looked tired and nervous. With two minutes to go, he took out a sheaf of notes and began going over them with a gold-and-black ballpoint pen. Across the U.S., Dick Nixon glanced at the monitor set, saw Kennedy with the notes, and glared angrily.

Steppingstones? Nixon picked up Kennedy's trigger-happy charge on the first go-round, tossed it back with the reminder that the last three wars (World War I, World War II and Korea) had begun in Democratic Administrations. ("I do not mean by that that one party is a war party.")

Then came a hot question to Nixon. Would he launch the U.S. into a war-conventional or nuclear--if Quemoy or Matsu were attacked? Answered Nixon:

"It would be completely irresponsible to indicate the course of action." Nixon thereupon took up a position that was substantially the longstanding Administration position: "In the event the attack was a prelude to an attack on Formosa--because the Chinese Communists say over and over again that their objective is not the offshore islands, that they consider them only Steppingstones to obtain Formosa --there isn't any question but that the United States would then honor our treaty obligations and stand by our ally, Formosa. To do what Senator Kennedy has suggested, to suggest that we will surrender these islands or force our Chinese Nationalist allies to surrender them in advance, is not something that would lead to peace." (Earlier at the Waldorf, Kennedy had suggested that the United Nations might take over Quemoy and Matsu as a compromise.)

Said Kennedy in rebuttal: "Mr. Nixon suggests that the United States should go to war if these two islands are attacked. He wants us to be committed to the defense of these islands merely as a defense of a free territory, not as a part of the defense of Formosa. Admiral Yarnell, the commander of the Asiatic Fleet, has said that these islands are not worth the bones of a single American."*

Obstacle? With those two basic positions stated, the rest of the debate turned on restatements of old positions. Kennedy tossed a low blow by recalling that Grand Dragon William J. Griffin of the Ku Klux Klan had indicated that he was going to vote for Nixon ("I do not suggest in any way that that indicates that Mr. Nixon has the slightest sympathy or involvement . . .") Nixon hedged on answers to questions on nuclear disarmament and control and labor policy by announcing that he would shortly deliver major speeches on these topics.

Both were asked about the 27 1/2% oil-depletion allowance, so dear to the hearts of Texas and Oklahoma oilmen. Kennedy was not opposing it and would restudy it after election; Nixon endorsed it wholeheartedly. Kennedy talked lightly about his inability to control Harry Truman's fiery public temper (see Democrats), but Nixon seized the occasion to declare fulsomely that President Eisenhower had restored dignity to the presidency ("I see mothers holding their babies up so that they can see a man who might be President of the United States"), and most newsmen were reminded of the Checkers speech. When the debate was over, Nixon called a foul because Kennedy had used notes--contrary to their oral agreement, he said--and Kennedy blandly said he had just wanted to be certain not to misquote the President of the U.S.

All in all, the session seemed something of an anticlimax after the first two, and ratings showed that audiences were declining--down to 60 million on the third from 73 million on the first. Physically, Nixon looked in fine form, and he was forceful in his replies. Who won? Increasingly, people seemed to be judging the debating as theatrical performances, and this time partisans of each seemed to think their candidate had won. But the rest of the world had only begun to listen in on the Quemoy-Matsu issue. On Formosa, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's spokesmen angrily denounced Kennedy, promised to fight to the military limit for the islands. In Washington the State Department denied that negotiations were in progress (as Kennedy suggested) for removal of 100,000 Nationalist troops from the embattled islands, and privately complained that the debate was seriously jeopardizing foreign policy.

In his post-debate speeches Nixon refrained from the ''I will not give up one inch" line and talked of defending Quemoy and Matsu only if an attack was a "prelude to invasion" of Formosa. He got a helping hand from the White House, which said that the President and Vice President agreed "exactly." Kennedy no longer stressed that he wanted to move the Chinese Nationalists out of the is lands, and said he could go along with the "prelude to invasion" definition. There now seemed little open water between the two positions, though undoubtedly there would be many more open words.

*Admiral Harry E. Yarnell was commander of the Asiatic Fleet from 1936 to 1939, when he was retired. (He was twice recalled to duty in Washington during World War II.) In 1955 the Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader queried top-ranking Army and Navy officers, asking: "Do you think giving up the liberty of Quemoy and Matsu would produce peace?" Yarnell was the only advocate of surrender: "To paraphrase Bismarck, these islands are not worth the bones of a single American. Use the surrender of the islands to secure the release of servicemen and civilians illegally held prisoners of the Chinese Communists." Among those who said no: General Claire Chennault, General James Van Fleet, Rear Admiral Robert Theobald, Lieut. General George Stratemeyer, Admiral Frederick Sherman, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld. Two who were noncommittal: Admiral William Halsey, General Mark Clark. Admiral Yarnell died, at 83, last year.

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