Toward Negotiation

Said Nikita Khrushchev to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson at a special conference last week in the Kremlin: "If we all keep our heads and do nothing provocative, we can find a way out of our problems in Laos." For 90 minutes Khrushchev and Thompson went over the Soviets' long-delayed reply to the Anglo-U.S. offer of negotiated peace in the faraway Southeast Asia state that is sundered by Communist attack. The Soviets accepted the proposal, more or less, announcing their decision in a note to London, and agreed to join Britain in an "appeal for a cessation of hostilities in Laos.''

The agreement cracked like a broken spring after ten days of mounting tension that saw John Fitzgerald Kennedy matched off against Nikita Khrushchev in a classic war of nerves. The war was fought against a sizable buildup of U.S. forces all across the Pacific. Tempers sharpened as the U.S. passed quiet word of deadlines that were just as quietly ignored by the Russians. The U.S. set out to rally its allies at the SEATO meeting in Bangkok while the Russians met secretly with theirs at a meeting of the War, saw Pact countries. With a loose agreement to negotiate, neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev came out the clear-cut victor. But by delaying their answer, the Russians had once again indicated that they felt that time was. and would continue to be, on their side.

Time for Advancement. Rather than submit to the Anglo-U.S. demand that an immediate cease-fire order precede any peace conference. Moscow called for talks forthwith and said vaguely that the Laotian belligerents should hammer out their own ceasefire. This could conceivably give time for the Red-led Pathet Lao forces to advance as they did last week (see THE WORLD). The talks would include prompt convocation of the three-nation International Control Commission (Canada, India, Poland) in Delhi and the opening of a 14-nation conference--notably including Communist China--in Cambodia. The U.S. shuddered at the thought of being involved in a prolonged negotiation while the Pathet Lao continued its offensive.

Just back from SEATO. Secretary of State Dean Rusk flew to Palm Beach to discuss the Soviet note with President Kennedy. "The Soviet note contains certain observations with which we cannot agree.'' said Kennedy dryly. But. he added, it "offers hope that a way can be found to establish a neutral and independent Laos through negotiations. The first need is to bring the present fighting in Laos to an end.''

Into the Garden. President Kennedy's flexings of U.S. diplomacy and power were the first of his Administration. Fortnight ago. he roused his countrymen by declaring that the safety of Laos "runs with the safety of us all." and he dispatched the U.S. Seventh Fleet and supporting forces toward Laos to back his implied deadline on a cease-fire in Laos. Kennedy flew to Key West for a first meeting with Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan early last week, met next day at the White House with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at Gromyko's request.

If Kennedy had hoped at the meeting for a hint of Soviet relaxation, he was disappointed. Frozen-faced Gromyko thawed not one bit as the two men talked formally for 30 minutes, surrounded by aides. Then Kennedy stood up from his padded wooden rocking chair, invited Gromyko to join him for a few minutes alone, and the two men stepped through the French doors into the sunny Rose Garden. There Gromyko appeared to soften, especially after Jacqueline Kennedy stopped by momentarily to greet Gromyko warmly and bid goodbye to Husband Jack before departing for Palm Beach.

Kennedy warned Gromyko of the gravity of the Laos crisis. U.S. prestige is so deeply committed in Laos, he said, that the crisis could explode into World War III. Gromyko retorted without bluster. He urged that the U.S. halt its military buildup of marines, guerrilla fighters and helicopters in northern Thailand until the Soviets had time to reply to the Anglo-U.S. truce offer. Kennedy did not commit himself. But the fact was that the U.S. buildup in Thailand did slacken during the week.

Compromise Communique. The U.S. opened its diplomatic drive on the SEATO front when Secretary of State Rusk touched down in the steaming heat of Bangkok for a conference of member foreign ministers. Rusk was determined to get SEATO to declare that, if the Soviets did not respond favorably by midweek to the Anglo-U.S. truce offer, then SEATO "will take military measures to check further aggression." SEATO's Asian members--the Thais, Pakistanis and Filipinos, who live in the shadow of Communism--strongly endorsed such a stand. But Rusk learned on his very first night in Bangkok that SEATO's European members were unwilling to go that far.

Rusk argued publicly and privately for a firm and unified free-world stand, finally agreed to a cautiously worded communique that left room for maneuver. It declared that SEATO member states "are prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate." "It contains all that is necessary," said Rusk later. "One of the purposes of foreign policy is not to produce drama but to work hard at problems and solve them." This sort of approach had the support of Britain, and U.S. diplomats felt that they had at least won France's implicit pledge not to veto the use of force in Laos by other SEATO members. Rusk confided to an aide: "This will make Kennedy happy." But the Thais, Filipinos and Pakistanis were plunged into gloom, expressed fears that the West might accede to "a Munich deal."

"The Important Thing." Western powers were indeed discussing some further concessions to the Communists. They were prepared to chuck the pro-Western though ineffectual Laotian government of Premier Boun Oum, restore left-leaning "neutralist" ex-Premier Souvanna Phouma as the Russians demanded. Last week a touring Souvanna admitted grandly in Paris that "it was on my request that the Soviets have granted, during the past few months, aid to troops faithful to my government." In any event, Souvanna was the same man whom the U.S. could have had six months ago at a far lower cost.

Nobody in Washington was inclined to view a negotiated settlement as much of a victory, for even a settlement along present battle lines could leave Laos partitioned. But the U.S. had decided to accept a diplomatic retreat, if necessary, rather than get involved in fighting. Said President Kennedy, with understatement: "Negotiations will not be simple and may take some time."

Doubtless the Communist rebels would secure a substantial voice in the future Laotian government, might well be able to win over the country the slower but safer way--without firing a shot. The optimists in the State Department said that all the West really needs to hold is the Southern crest of Laos that buffers Thailand and South Viet Nam from Communism. Pessimists, and there were many, feared that the magnetism of Communism would soon pull over any "neutral" Laos.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.