WESTMORELAND ON THE WAR

After four years in Viet Nam, more than three as commander of all American forces there, General William Childs Westmoreland, 54, is about to return to Washington to become Army Chief of Staff. Leaving Viet Nam with the reluctance of any commander who would like to see a campaign through to its end, Westmoreland is also disturbed by the fact that his conduct of the war has been questioned more since the Communists' Tet offensive than at any other time during his tour of duty. In an interview last week with TIME Bureau Chief William Rademaekers, he reviewed his stewardship and replied to his critics on a variety of points.

On the Army of South Viet Nam (ARVN). We had problems in almost every possible category of military activity when I first came here. The ARVN had problems in training, leadership, equipment, personnel and logistics. All of these either have been eliminated or are well on the road to elimination. In fact, the ARVN has become an effective fighting organization, as it well demonstrated during the Tet offensive and in numerous actions since.

On the U.S. Role. On the U.S. side, the biggest initial problems were logistical, the number of troops available and the lack of U.S. troops' experience in a counterinsurgency environment. To build a logistical base to support over half a million men has been a herculean task. We now have six instead of one deep-water ports, eight instead of three jet-capable airfields. Air supply has been developed until I am sure it is the most efficient in history. As far as troop strength is concerned, we had to use fire-brigade tactics until late 1966, when we were strong enough to begin to apply heavy pressure on the enemy. Our capability in this regard has improved ever since. With respect to the U.S. lack of experience in guerrilla warfare, I believe our military men have performed magnificently. They quickly learned the tactics and techniques of jungle and rice-paddy fighting, and stateside training was rapidly adapted to fit the situation. Today I consider our soldiers and Marines considerably more proficient in the type of combat that occurs in Viet Nam than the North Vietnamese troops and better than most Viet Cong units.

On the Enemy and Tet. Beginning in late 1967, the enemy adopted a more offensive attitude, culminating with his Tet offensive. Although he undoubtedly gained a temporary psychological victory, he suffered a grievous military loss that has served to further enhance our military progress. From the standpoint of pacification, progress was inhibited by the Tet offensive. But the aggressive action of the government has definitely reversed the trend and much of the ground lost has been regained.

On a Possible Enclave Strategy.

Should we pull our forces in close to specific populated enclaves in order to improve theoretically the security of those areas, we would make a de facto partition of the country, similar to what has happened in Laos. It is a defeatist strategy, since the enemy always has the initiative. The only sound reason I know to adopt such a strategy in Viet Nam would be as a prelude to withdrawal from the country.

On the "Oil Spot" Strategy. This theory is that you seize and secure an area and then move out from that area, securing ever increasing concentric circles of terrain until the entire country is secure. Unless we had a massive infusion of new troops, such a strategy would take many years and become in effect an enclave strategy, with all of its disadvantages, while the rooting-out process was going on. The military initiative would be largely lost.

On Search and Destroy. Our strategy in Viet Nam is most definitely not a search-and-destroy strategy, and it is unfortunate that it has been so characterized by some. Search and destroy is merely an abbreviated version of a time-honored infantry mission: "Find, fix, fight and destroy the enemy." It is not a strategy or a tactic; it is a mission. Our military strategy in Viet Nam has had three objectives: 1) provide protection for allied bases, 2) provide security for as much of the population as possible and 3) destroy the enemy armed forces.

On the Criticism that Allied Forces Do Not Fight Enough at Night. This was a valid criticism at one time, but it is not true today. During the first three months of this year, there were 629 ambushes--mostly at night--sprung on the enemy by friendly forces, as opposed to only 81--mostly during the day--initiated by the enemy.

On Where the U.S. Stands Today. The allies are in the strongest relative military position in Viet Nam today that we have yet achieved.

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