AUGURIES OF A BREAKTHROUGH

NOT since North Viet Nam first agreed to sit down at the negotiating table with the U.S. had prospects seemed so good for a major move toward peace. There was no single, compelling piece of evidence that Hanoi was about to make important concessions in return for complete suspension by the U.S. of its bombing attacks on North Viet Nam. But the hopeful hints and tantalizing suggestions continued to pile up. For that reason, an air of suspense enveloped the Cabinet Room of the White House last week as Lyndon Johnson began his press conference. He had scheduled it well in advance, and there was considerable speculation that he had done so in order to make a spectacular announcement. What he had to say proved distinctly undramatic. "We do not want to make news," the President declared, "until there is news."

Nonetheless, there were distinct auguries that a breakthrough might be near. The news surfaced that the No. 2 U.S. negotiator, Cyrus Vance, has been meeting secretly in Paris for some time with his North Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Ha Van Lau. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin saw Secretary of State Dean Rusk twice in Washington, pressing Moscow's view that Hanoi is ready to be helpful. In Pe king, the New China News Agency reported for the first time that talks were under way between Washington and Hanoi--as if to prepare the Chinese people for the possibility of a dramatic new turn in the war. In New York City, Richard Nixon issued a statement suggesting that he, too, was convinced a bombing pause was imminent.

Not Enough. For all the omens, there was still no definitive sign of a break in the barriers after nearly six months of negotiations in Paris. One Administration expert concluded: "Basically, we are pushing the same old counters we've pushed since May. During the past month we've been pushing them around more swiftly, to be sure. But that's the only difference."

There is no real secret about what now divides the U.S. and North Viet Nam. There are two issues, and each came under intense scrutiny last week:

1) If President Johnson orders an end to all bombing of North Viet Nam--which he can do at any moment for diplomatic reasons, for domestic political reasons, or for no stated reason at all--will the enemy similarly de-escalate, or will he simply take advantage of the lull to regroup and resupply his forces? The voices from Hanoi were obscure. Administration sources claim Hanoi says "we will understand what to do" if the U.S. halts the bombing. In Paris, Communist Negotiator Xuan Thuy said smilingly: "If President Johnson really wants to stop the bombing unconditionally, he himself knows there are numerous favorable opportunities." So far, these hints have not been enough for L.B.J.

2) Both South Viet Nam and the Viet Cong must join the U.S. and North Viet Nam at the bargaining table if any settlement is to be reached. But Saigon claims that it alone speaks for the South Vietnamese and Hanoi insists that only the Viet Cong really represent the people of the South. Up to now, Hanoi has insisted on a "four-side formula," with separate representation for the Americans, the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front, the Viet Cong's political arm. Saigon wants to be there separately but insists that the N.L.F. sit only as part of the Hanoi delegation. The eventual compromise will probably be a "two-side" solution, the Viet Cong sitting with Hanoi and the South Vietnamese with the U.S.

Smoky Fireballs. Two weeks ago, fewer U.S. lives--exactly 100--were lost in Viet Nam than in any week since August 1967. Russian diplomats strongly suggested that this relative lull in the fighting was a deliberate signal from Hanoi to encourage a pause in the bombing. It may be that the Soviet Union is simply seeking to distract American attention from the Russian military maneuvering in Eastern Europe. But during a similar lull in fighting in August the Soviets stayed silent.

If there was such a message from Hanoi to Washington it was not getting through. When the weather cleared late last week, U.S. bombers flew 122 missions in one day over the southern panhandle of North Viet Nam. Navy A-7 Corsairs hit three gasoline-storage tanks 15 miles below Vinh, sending great smoky fireballs into the sky. In South Viet Nam, an enemy force 200 strong took heavy casualties in an attack on U.S. 1st Division positions three miles from the Cambodian border--the first enemy-initiated fighting in a month.

In Saigon and in Washington, the argument waxed. Did North Viet Nam's withdrawal of some 40,000 troops really betoken peaceful intent, or was it the prelude to another mass offensive? Because the 1968 Tet and summer assaults were preceded by similar retreats for rest and resupply, some experts contended that Hanoi was repeating the pattern--and predicted a new offensive, possibly some time this month.

Open Acknowledgment. Should the U.S. decide to interpret these conflicting signals as evidence of a desire for peace, it is possible that Washington will declare a bombing halt without any openly admitted quid pro quo from Hanoi. Johnson has asked the North Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from the DMZ, to stop attacks on the cities of South Viet Nam, and to accept participation in the Paris talks by the Saigon government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. In return, he would agree to the N.L.F. taking part in negotiations.

Johnson has not demanded public acceptance by Hanoi to his conditions. But Thieu feels that he needs some sort of open acknowledgment to protect his own political flanks. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker put in seven strenuous sessions, some lasting more than two hours, with Thieu in the course of ten days. At first, Thieu was amenable to the U.S. terms. After meeting with his National Security Council, he flatly refused to consent to N.L.F. representation in Paris. For the moment, that was that. Thieu treads a delicate line. On the one hand are his hard-line rivals, ex-Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Ky's militant allies; on the other, powerful neutralists like Buddhist Leader Thich Tri Quang. In this situation, Thieu cannot afford to countenance the N.L.F.'s claim to speak for all the people of South Viet Nam.

Flurry of Meetings. Apart from Thieu, Johnson has yet another problem: if he does not get public concessions from Hanoi in response to a bombing halt, he risks the accusation that he is endangering the lives of U.S. servicemen solely to give Hubert Humphrey a political advantage.

In a roundabout way, Richard Nixon leveled such an accusation at the President last week. "In the last 36 hours," he proclaimed, "I have been advised of a flurry of meetings in the White House and elsewhere on Viet Nam. I am told that top officials in the Administration have been driving very hard for an agreement on a bombing halt, accompanied possibly by a ceasefire, in the immediate future." Then the thrust: "I am also told that this spurt of activity is a cynical, last-minute attempt by President Johnson to salvage the candidacy of Mr. Humphrey. This I do not believe." Making the accusation in one breath and disavowing it in the next, he made certain that the charge would be noticed.

Until recently, the war in Viet Nam was a dormant issue in the 1968 presidential election campaign--compared with law and order, the cities, and even inflation. The chance of a bombing pause brought it back into sudden political prominence. Both Nixon and Humphrey strategists agree that a break in the war could help Humphrey, the Administration's defender, by as much as two percentage points in the popular vote on Election Day. With such big, key states as New York, Pennsylvania and Michigan now rated as tossups, a bombing halt could conceivably give Humphrey a significant though probably not decisive boost in electoral votes.

Stout Reeds. In the swamp of conflicting motives and interpretations surrounding talk of a bombing pause, there were a few seemingly stout reeds. The obvious Russian interest alone was rea son for optimism. So, on the other side, was the U.S. gesture of returning 14 captured North Vietnamese sailors, followed by an unusual South Vietnamese pledge to free 140 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners in time for National Day on Nov. 1.

President Johnson, too, was enigmatically encouraging at his press conference. He showed himself content to have helped get negotiations started by renouncing a second term and declaring a partial bombing halt. "I think the decision of March 31st was indicated, was justified," he said, "and I am more pleased by it every hour that goes by." If that meant the Paris negotiations would get serious any hour--or that an end to more than four years of U.S. bombing in North Viet Nam was imminent--he was not telling.

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