The Hostage Drama

By Thomas A. Sancton

Rumors of a deal feed hopes of freedom for Tehran's American captives

For nearly a year the 52 American hostages in Iran have been the world's most conspicuous captives.

Hopes for their release have been periodically raised, and then abruptly shattered. Once again last week there was a dizzying flurry of rumors that the prisoners of the Islamic militants might soon get their freedom--perhaps in a deal involving the shipment of U.S. military supplies to embattled Iran. And once again, the final decision over their fate depended on the unpredictable judgment of Tehran's parliament, the 228-member Majlis, a body dominated by the most fanatical followers of the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini.

On Sunday the Majlis met to discuss the fate of the hostages. After a stormy public debate, the members went into secret session, which ended without a resolution of the issue; another secret session was scheduled for Monday. Moderate forces in the Majlis defeated a motion to suspend debate until after the U.S. elections. But anti-American zealots were carrying out a filibuster, designed to prevent an early vote on proposed conditions for the hostages' release that were believed to be acceptable to the U.S.

A hostage homecoming, if it came on the eve of a closely fought presidential election, might put Carter in the White House for another four years. The prospect of a hostage deal, however, confronted his Administration with an acute foreign-policy dilemma. Because of obvious political as well as humanitarian considerations, the President could hardly reject any reasonable terms for the freedom of the captives. Yet any U.S. concessions, particularly on the shipment of military spare parts, might compromise Washington's neutral stance on the Persian Gulf war, thereby enraging Iraq and dismaying its pro-American supporters in the war with Iran --Saudi Arabia and Jordan. At worst, such a quid pro quo might be construed by Moscow as direct U.S. interference and thus provide an alibi for an expanded Soviet role in the conflict.

At week's end Administration officials reported that Iran was considering an initial release of up to 40 hostages, with the others to be held pending a final settlement of the U.S.-Iran dispute. But such a partial liberation would put Carter in a political bind at home--especially if the remaining hostages were subjected to trials. Washington thus sent word to Tehran insisting on the release of all the Americans at the same time.

Long before the Iraqis invaded Iran on Sept. 22, leading Iranian moderates, including President Abolhassan Banisadr, had warned that holding the hostages was pushing Iran into dangerous diplomatic isolation. Khomeini appeared ready to seek a compromise in September when he announced a scaled-down set of conditions for the release. Though the 80-year-old Islamic revolutionary gave the Majlis final responsibility over the American captives, he suggested the following terms for their freedom: 1) return of the late Shah's wealth, 2) cancellation of all U.S. claims against Iran, 3) release of Iranian assets frozen in the U.S. and 4) an American guarantee of noninterference in Iranian affairs. Khomeini's list dropped previous Iranian insistence on a formal American apology and a trial for the hostages. Washington subsequently sent word that Khomeini's four conditions might serve as a basis for negotiations.

Two weeks ago, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i visited the U.N. to denounce the Iraqi invasion. Although he ignored Carter's offer of a direct meeting, Raja'i told a New York press conference that the U.S. now appeared "ready to cooperate" on resolving the issue. He later said he expected the Majlis to agree that Khomeini's four demands were sufficient and was "certain" that Washington would accept them. Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani fueled hopes by predicting the speedy liberation of the hostages and minimizing the possibility that any would be tried as spies. Hojatolislam Ashgar Mousavi Khoeiny, a member of the parliamentary committee set up to propose conditions for the hostages' release, said the Americans might be freed early this week. But after the Sunday session of the Majlis ended in stalemate, a State Department official estimated that there was only about a 10% chance that the hostages would be home before the election, even if the debate ends favorably.

The Carter Administration, meanwhile, was sending Tehran clear signs of its good will.

Speaking in Chicago, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie criticized Iraq's "invasion" and said the U.S. opposed the "dismemberment" of Iran.

Muskie also suggested that top Administration officials would willingly fly to Iran to negotiate the hostage release directly. Carter, stumping in Ohio, promised a three-point response to a hostage release: 1) the unfreezing of Tehran's assets, 2) an end to the trade embargo, which could mean the resumption of military spare parts shipments and 3) the restoration of "normal commerce" with Iran. Finally, U.S. Ambassador Donald F. McHenry told the United Nations Security Council: "The cohesion and stability of Iran is in the interest of the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole. The national integrity of Iran is today threatened by the Iraqi invasion."

U.S. diplomats were rather more cautious than Carter's entourage in responding to what State Department Spokesman John Trattner called the "delicious shudder of rumors." Privately, some State Department veterans were dismayed that a pro-Iranian policy was being concocted on the hustings for what might in part be domestic political reasons. One cause for diplomatic skepticism was Iran's crippling internal political dissensions, which had frustrated all past attempts to obtain the freedom of the hostages. Another was the lack of any reliable channel for the direct negotiations that would be necessary to seal an agreement.

A further obstacle to any prospective hostage deal lay in the snarl of legal complications that would make it impossible for Washington to deliver promptly on three of Khomeini's four conditions. Last Nov. 14, Carter issued an Executive order that froze more than $8 billion in Iranian assets held by U.S. banks. To unfreeze them now, explained the legal counsel for a major New York bank, would be "like putting an omelet back into the egg." Various corporations and individuals have liens against those assets to cover unpaid Iranian debts, and U.S. banks have "offset" a total of about $1.5 billion to cover their outstanding loans to Iran. Said David Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank: "If the Iranians think they are going to get all the assets they have here immediately, they're going to be disappointed."

As for the Shah's fortune, the State Department has been unable even to inventory his U.S. holdings. However, the U.S. would have no authority to turn them over to Tehran unless litigation proved they had been illegally acquired by the Shah and his relatives. About all the Administration could do to satisfy this condition would be to assist the Iranians in tracking down the Pahlavi fortune and pursuing it through the U.S. courts.

Tehran's leaders probably realize that they could not swiftly recover all the frozen assets. Their most immediate interest may be the reopening of a supply channel for spare parts and ammunition for Iran's U.S.-built arms and materiel. If and when the trade embargo is lifted, there would be no legal obstacle to the shipment of $550 million worth of impounded military equipment ordered and paid for by the Shah.

Prime Minister Raja'i last week denied any intention of seeking "new arms deals" with Washington. Carter, for his part, ambiguously declared that no "lethal" military equipment would be shipped to Iran while the war continued.

U.S. policymakers could not ignore the ominous view that some Arab nations would attach to any improvement of U.S.Iranian relations. One senior Administration official expressed the hope that the more reasonable Persian Gulf states, and possibly even Iraq, "would understand the context in which it was done." But there were few signs of such comprehension. The Iraqis and their friends were clearly concerned that a new flow of military supplies, even of a nonlethal nature, could invigorate Iran's beleaguered forces and possibly help turn the tide of war.

The Saudis were especially worried lest a resumption of American shipments goad the

Soviets to assert greater influence through their own supply channels to the region--thus tainting Moscow's neutrality and contributing to the polarization of the superpowers in the gulf conflict. This threat was implicitly raised last week by Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, who warned that Iraq would consider the U.S. a "hostile party in the gulf conflict" if it sent supplies to Iran. Hammadi added: "The U.S. had better remain neutral, or else other parties could become directly involved in the war."

Even pro-U.S. Arab states were bewildered by the mixed signals from Washington. The Saudis, for example, were pleased by the rapid deployment last month of four U.S. AW ACS surveillance planes to aid in the defense of their oilfields. But the latest U.S. overtures to Iran have revived their frustration over the vacillating tendencies of the Administration's foreign policy.

Apart from its diplomatic repercussions, the renewed shipment of spare parts for Iranian Phantom fighter jets could considerably improve Tehran's military effectiveness in the struggle. Iranian pilots have demonstrated clear-cut superiority so far during the war, but their bombing and strafing forays have been curtailed by a spare parts shortage that has kept half their planes grounded. If Iran's air force could launch more effective bombing raids, it might be able to mount counterattacks against the Iraqi ground forces. "If we could afford the luxury of a little hardware wastage," said one Iranian military official last week,"we would make mincemeat of the armed forces of Iraq in an unbelievably short time."

Tehran was in need of some sort of boost as the Iraqi army tightened its hold on the major cities of oil-rich Khuzistan province. At week's end, after a monthlong siege and weeks of hand-to-hand combat, Iraqi troops and tanks seized the key port of Khorramshahr on the disputed Shatt al Arab estuary. "The Iranian flag was lowered from over the government house in Mohammerah [the Arabic name for Khorramshahr], and the Iraqi flag was hoisted to declare the return of the city to Arab rule forever," proclaimed a triumphant Iraqi military communique. Defense Minister Major General Adnan Khairallah said that Iraq had captured 7,700 sq. mi. of Iranian territory since the war began.

Radio Tehran contested the Iraqi claims, insisting that Revolutionary Guards still held key quarters of Khorramshahr. But Iran admitted that the major refinery city of Abadan, ten miles to the south, had been totally surrounded by Iraqi forces seeking to starve out its last defenders. The Iraqis reportedly blew up sections of the main pipeline linking Abadan to Tehran, thereby depriving Iran of most of its domestic fuel supply. The Iranian Oil Ministry imposed a drastic rationing of home heating oil, following earlier restrictions on gasoline. The fall of Khorramshahr gave Iraqi President Saddam Hussein his first major victory. It also left the Iraqis in complete control of the Shatt al Arab and bolstered their military position as they continued assaults not only on Abadan but also on the other key Khuzistan cities of Ahwaz and Dezful. Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister, Tana Yasin Ramadan, reportedly stated that Baghdad's objective was to take not only the main provincial cities but Khuzistan's oilfields as well. These would be held until the Iranians accepted the three conditions stated by Baghdad at the beginning of the conflict: l)Iraqi control over the Shatt al Arab, 2) redefinition of the border and 3) return of three gulf islands to "Arab sovereignty."

There are signs that Iraq's political objectives have broadened. Saddam apparently wants to "liberate" oil-rich Khuzistan, which has a predominantly Arab population and is known to its inhabitants as Arabistan. Iraqi officials now offer their "private opinion" that the war will result in an autonomous Arabistan with close ties to Baghdad.

On a tour of the combat zone, TIME Middle East Bureau Chief William Stewart observed a major road-building operation under way between a point on theBasra, to the Iraqi front at Ahwaz some 100 miles to the northeast. Reported Stewart: "Civilians man hundreds of giant road-building machines night and day in an effort to complete the two-lane high way before the rainy season next month. Beyond its immediate military value, the undertaking suggests that the Iraqis intend to settle in for a long stay and are perhaps even preparing a direct communications network between Iraq and a future Arabistan."

Despite some successes, Iraq so far has been unable to crush Iranian resistance. One reason has been the tenacity of the Iranians. Khomeini welcomed the war from the outset as a blessing in disguise; his enthusiasm appears undiminished by military setbacks. Last week he called on Iranians to prepare for a jihad, or holy war, against Saddam's "pagan regime."

Khomeini's bellicosity is fully shared by other clerical leaders, who see the war as a unique chance to export their Islamic revolution by the sword. The mullahs have recruited their own irregular forces at hundreds of local mosques, and many of the clerics have taken military instruction themselves. Iran's "patriotic war" has also been joined by hundreds of seasoned leftist guerrillas, who brave clerical harassment in order to fight the common Iraqi enemy.

Iran's conventional forces and the Revolutionary Guards, who bear the brunt of the defense effort, have not been the pushovers that Iraq apparently expected them to be. The Iranian air force, in particular, has repeatedly defied enemy antiaircraft defenses to blast strategic targets deep inside Iraq. Iranian gun boats have remained a threat to Iraqi shipping and coastal installations. Consequently, after five weeks of fighting, Iraq was winning the battle for Khuzistan, but had by no means won the war. The fundamental problem was how to end a struggle in which both sides have vowed never to retreat or surrender. Iran has a historical affinity for martyrdom, Iraq for violence to the point of self-destruction.

Diplomatic overtures launched last week raised little hope for a speedy end to hostilities. A "good will" mission sent to Tehran by the Islamic Conference was haughtily instructed by Khomeini to limit its activities to investigating Iraqi "war crimes." The special session of the U.N. Security Council called to discuss the war ended inconclusively.

Meanwhile, as black clouds continued to rise over burning refineries on both sides of the embattled border, the stakes grew larger daily -- not only for the belligerent neighbors but also for a world faced with the alarming prospect of a broader confrontation along Asia's volatile crescent of crisis. Reported by William Stewart/Basra and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

With reporting by William Stewart, Gregory H. Wierzynski

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.