An Oversupply of Voices

By James Kelly

Reagan struggles to make the allies speak as one on Poland

"The political gap between Western Europe and the U.S. over the Polish crisis exists, all right. But now it is measured in yards rather than miles." So said one French diplomat last week, and, indeed, the distance between Washington and its NATO allies on a joint response to the crackdown in Poland had seemingly narrowed. Meeting in Brussels, the foreign ministers of the ten-member European Community issued a statement promising that the group would avoid actions that might undercut the sanctions imposed by Washington against Moscow two weeks ago. Then, at a summit meeting with President Reagan that had promised to be a frosty confrontation, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt for the first time publicly fingered the Soviets for enforcing the repression in Poland.

Schmidt's statement was significant because West Germany has lagged behind other allies in criticizing Moscow, and has been most vocal in its refusal to impose sanctions against the Soviet Union. U.S. officials hoped that the Chancellor's toughened stance will pay off this week at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. The ministers prepared a joint declaration, scheduled to be issued Monday, that unequivocally blamed the Soviets for the Polish crackdown. But the allies were not expected to join the U.S. in levying sanctions.

Neither side had expected the Reagan-Schmidt meeting to be especially warm. From the time martial law was declared in Poland last December, Schmidt's criticism of the crackdown has been notably mild. The Administration, meanwhile, made little secret of its annoyance with the Chancellor's cautious attitude. One seasoned European observer predicted before the summit: "Reagan is going to give Schmidt one helluva rap on the knuckles."

The rap never came. In his 2 1/2-hr. meeting with Reagan, Schmidt blunted the sharply critical approach that the President had planned with some disarming observations. He admitted that his first reaction to the Polish crisis was soft, but said he had not been fully briefed. Then, veering off the subject, he apologized for a West German vote on a United Nations resolution in December attacking U.S. policy in El Salvador. Most important, Schmidt readily agreed to endorse a formal joint statement that stressed his support for the American position on Poland.

The session was not without tensions. Chain-smoking throughout the meeting, Schmidt appeared on the defensive. He claimed that the American press had misrepresented the West German view of the Soviet role in the Polish crackdown, and noted that a letter he had sent to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev last month was proof that Bonn believed in Moscow's involvement. "If one read only American newspapers," he told Reagan, "you would think the U.S.-German alliance was dead." But Schmidt also made clear that he did not think the sanctions against Moscow would work, and thus he did not plan to adopt them himself.

During the session Schmidt kept changing the subject. He talked about Brezhnev's visit to Bonn last November and urged Reagan to consider a meeting with the Soviet leader. (Haig is against summit meetings unless they can be crowned by accords worked out ahead of time, but Reagan tends to accept Schmidt's argument that any kind of high-level East-West talk is better than no talk at all.) As he has frequently done in the past, Schmidt blamed high U.S. interest rates for raising the prices of European imports and thus crimping the world's economic recovery. "He did his usual sermon," said a White House aide. "It seemed a clear effort to stave off awkward exchanges on Poland."

The President answered that it was naive to think that the U.S. believed sanctions would cripple the Soviet economy. He knew they would not. But he stressed that the measures were politically symbolic, which is why the Soviets have denounced them so shrilly. For this reason, Reagan argued, Western unity is important, since the Soviets do care about public opinion.

The language of the joint communique suggested that Schmidt got the message. "The President and the Chancellor agreed on their analysis of the Polish situation," read one key line. "They both noted the responsibility of the Soviet Union for developments in Poland and expressed concern about the serious pressure it is bringing to bear against Polish efforts for renewal." Nevertheless, a slight chilliness hung in the air when Reagan bid Schmidt goodbye outside the White House. Forsaking the usual flowery farewell, an unsmiling Reagan told reporters that "should we fail to insist that the Soviet Union stop pressuring Poland . . . the gravest consequences for international relations could ensue." Also stern of face, Schmidt began by saying, "I can fully subscribe to what your President just told you," but studiously avoided any reference to Moscow.

Still, presidential aides pronounced themselves "very pleased" with the meeting. They believed that Schmidt left Washington with a different perspective on Poland than he had when he arrived. "He came along on the Soviets in the joint statement," said one Administration official. "It shows progress. The Germans are increasingly concerned about being odd man out among the allies."

Washington was also heartened by the communique issued by the foreign ministers of the European Community. That statement matched the tough anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Reagan Administration virtually word for word. Though the ministers neither joined nor endorsed the American sanctions, they promised "close and positive consultations" with the U.S. on any future economic and diplomatic moves against Warsaw and Moscow if the crisis continues.

The crackdown in Poland also influenced two long-debated U.S. foreign policy decisions. Reagan last week approved a high-level mission to Peking that will present the Chinese with an intriguing offer: U.S. agreement not to sell Taiwan a line of sophisticated fighter planes, in exchange for Peking's condemnation of the Soviet role in Poland (see following story). Reagan also decided to continue draft registration for 18-year-old males. President Carter ordered the resumption of registration in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a move that was roundly denounced by Candidate Reagan. At the time, Reagan insisted that registration saved only a few days in mobilizing draftees in case of war. But last week he said that new studies had shown registration could shave off as much as six weeks. Though officials denied that the Polish situation figured in Reagan's decision, White House advisers privately conceded that it would have been the wrong time to revoke draft registration, lest misleading signals be sent to Moscow and the allies.

Despite the show of support by Schmidt and the ministers of the European Community, the allies still had ample complaints and questions about the conduct and direction of U.S. foreign policy in the Polish crisis. The most common protest was that Washington once again had failed to consult with the allies on sanctions, and then had insisted that Europe come up with a strong response too. As one West German diplomat summed up his view of Washington's attitude: " 'We'll tell you what we are going to do, we do it, and we expect you to follow suit.' That just doesn't work."

The Europeans also believe that Reagan refused to invoke the only effective economic sanction against Moscow, an embargo of U.S. grain, simply because he did not want to hurt American farmers. Nonetheless, they complain, the President expects the allies to ban the export of high technology to the U.S.S.R. and shelve plans for building a 3,000-mile natural-gas pipeline from Siberia to West Germany. "These measures would be much more costly to us than anything the U.S. has done," insists a French official. "If the U.S. were to cut off grain sales, then perhaps it could ask Europe to take these steps."

Some European officials are openly concerned about the quality of advice that Reagan receives from the men around him. They fear that the President's most hawkish advisers, notably Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and White House Counsellor Edwin Meese, may look upon the Polish crisis as a chance to loosen the Soviet grasp on Eastern Europe. Such a policy, in turn, might force Moscow to crack down even harder. Others claim to hear too many voices coming from the Administration. Says a peeved British diplomat: "No sooner does one U.S. official announce an attitude than within 24 hours another one says the direct opposite."

The appointment last week of Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark, a longtime Reagan associate, to replace Richard Allen as National Security Adviser may clear up some of these confusing signals. Nonetheless, the complaints of the Europeans again highlight the difficulty of getting the allies to work in concert at times of crisis. That problem may be insoluble. "It would always be better if the West could react in solidarity and immediately to a Soviet challenge," wrote Italian Columnist Arrigo Levi in La Stampa last week. "But the West is not an empire. It is an alliance of free people that must take into account the diversity of its opinions and interests."

--By James Kelly. Reported by Roland Flamini and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

With reporting by Roland Flamini, Gregory H. Wierzynski

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