Summit Hopes

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

When Nicholas Daniloff was ensnared four weeks ago in a KGB trap, it was thought the tense game of pawns that ensued would prevent any progress on arms control or toward a Soviet-American summit. Instead, something quite different occurred. Movement on arms control increased, and so did hopes for a year-end meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. As a result, the dog seemed to wag the tail for a change: the desire to reach an accord on the major issues dividing the superpowers created an eagerness to resolve, as quickly as face-saving maneuvers would allow, the dispute involving the U.S. News & World Report correspondent and Gennadi Zakharov, the Soviet U.N. employee awaiting trial in New York City on spy charges.

From the beginning, the Daniloff affair (which now encompasses not only the arrest of Zakharov but also Washington's order to expel 25 Soviet employees from the U.N.) has been seen as a ready gauge of the desire in Moscow and Washington for progress on larger issues. If both sides wanted a summit, it was thought, a way would be found to untangle the affair. That forced both leaders, after months of dithering, to face squarely the question of how badly they really desired to meet again. The answer: badly enough to give their diplomats a go-ahead to negotiate a face-saving compromise.

A series of meetings between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the U.N. in New York City uncovered the outlines of a potential bargain: Daniloff would be released quickly and probably without any trial on what the U.S. regards as trumped-up espionage charges against him. Zakharov would be traded later for one or more Soviet dissidents. The expulsion of the 25 Soviets at the U.N. remains a sticking point.

The significance of all this activity went far beyond the fates of Daniloff and Zakharov, and even beyond the prospect of another chance for Reagan to sit by a fireplace with Gorbachev. The goal that suddenly seemed in sight was a potentially important breakthrough in arms control. Both sides have been quietly inching toward a bargain on the highly charged issue of intermediate- range nuclear forces, one that for the first time would significantly reduce -- rather than just set a ceiling on -- the number of nuclear weapons. At the U.N. last week, Reagan and Shevardnadze raised hopes for a quick agreement; in ( Geneva, Soviet and American negotiators are close to filling in some key numbers. The emerging deal: the Soviets would drop their insistence that any INF accord be linked to ones involving long-range strategic arms and space- based defensive weapons; INF warheads in Europe would be slashed to a "token" 100 on each side, representing a cut of more than 85% in the number of Soviet SS-20s now threatening U.S. allies.

None of this is yet guaranteed. In addition to the remaining complications surrounding Daniloff's release, there are disputes over details of any INF pact -- both with Moscow and among the warring factions of the Reagan Administration. The freeing of Daniloff, even if followed by an INF deal, would leave the U.S. and U.S.S.R. still at odds over more crucial issues, most notably strategic-arms reductions (START) and Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars.

From what the superpowers were saying in public, even an interim INF deal would have seemed elusive as recently as two weeks ago. When they first met in Geneva last November, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed on the spot to hold two more summits: one in the U.S. this year, the other in the Soviet Union in 1987. But through most of early 1986 the two leaders appeared less eager to fulfill that commitment than to pin the blame on each other for trying to wiggle out of it. Gorbachev annoyed the U.S. by unveiling a series of grandiose arms-control proposals that Washington judged to be largely propaganda maneuvers designed to put Reagan on the defensive; after the U.S. air strike against Libya, a Soviet client, Moscow called off a summit-planning visit by Shevardnadze to Shultz that had been scheduled for May. Each side kept grumbling that the behavior of the other raised grave doubts about how much it wanted either a summit or an agreement of any kind. The tone of the superpower exchanges began to change over the summer, as a variety of exchanges between the President and the Soviet leader encouraged arms experts in Geneva to make solid progress. But then the Zakharov-Daniloff matter exploded at the end of August, giving each side a perfect excuse to call off a summit if it wanted to do so.

That neither side did want to back out any longer first became obvious on Sept. 19, after Shevardnadze arrived in Washington for his long-delayed talks with Shultz and an unscheduled call on Reagan in the Oval Office. Though much of the discussion was taken up by stern American lectures about Daniloff, neither Reagan nor Shultz let the dispute prevent progress on arms control. Shevardnadze handed Reagan a personal letter from Gorbachev replying to arms- control proposals the President had made in July. The Soviet Foreign Minister also hinted at further concessions toward an INF agreement. He and Shultz wound up their meetings expressing unexpected optimism about prospects for a summit and an INF accord -- if only the Daniloff issue could somehow be resolved.

At the opening of the 41st session of the U.N. General Assembly last week, both sides proclaimed these conclusions publicly. After insisting that Daniloff was an "innocent hostage," Reagan went on to say the Geneva talks held out the hope that the "ice of the negotiating stalemate could break." The U.S., he said, "is prepared to conclude an interim (INF) agreement without delay." The President did not mention a summit, but Shevardnadze filled in that gap the next day. The key passage in his speech: "Lately, encouraging outlines of meaningful agreements have been emerging. A summit meeting is also a realistic possibility. We could move forward rather smoothly, if that is what the U.S. side wants."

The best proof that Reagan does want a summit is that he has been willing to endure scathing criticism from right-wing supporters who wanted him to force a full-scale showdown with Moscow over Daniloff's detention. (The public, however, seems to approve of the President's course. Three-quarters of the people questioned in a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll published last week thought Reagan should go to a summit even if Daniloff was still stuck in Moscow; only 18% said he should not.) Reagan badly wants to wind up his presidency in a blaze of glory as the leader who restored U.S. military and economic might to a point at which he could negotiate a favorable arms-control deal. But the clock is winding down: some solid progress must be registered in the next year or so, before the U.S. becomes preoccupied with the 1988 presidential campaign.

The Soviets can hear the American political clock ticking too: they cannot be sure the President elected in 1988 will be as willing to deal as Reagan has become or will have the enormous popularity that would enable Reagan to sell a bargain to the U.S. public. Gorbachev seems eager for an arms deal of some kind: he might suffer a heavy propaganda defeat if he refused to go to a summit, but he has vowed repeatedly not to be put off again with a smile and a handshake as he was in Geneva. In recent days the Soviets seem to have seized on an INF agreement as an excuse rather than a precondition for a summit. When one American journalist remarked on the difficulties of separating an INF pact from the negotiations on long-range strategic weapons and Star Wars, a high Soviet official replied in an almost plaintive tone, "Yes, but we need something."

Why INF? The issue has certainly stirred passion in the past. When the U.S. began installing missiles in Western Europe in late 1983, the Soviets stomped out of the Geneva arms negotiations for 16 months. Nonetheless, the Soviet SS- 20s and the U.S. Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe do not play a central part in either superpower's nuclear strategy. They are important less as weapons than as political symbols, and in that role they have largely outlived their usefulness. The menace of the Soviet SS-20s failed to scare West European nations out of their alliance with the U.S.; on the contrary, they prompted NATO allies to face down hysterical opposition from domestic peace movements and allow U.S. missiles to be placed on their soil as a counterweight to the Soviet launchers. By carrying through the deployment, the U.S. made its point: it would defend its allies. Now it can sacrifice most of the missiles without loss, particularly since the original purpose of installing them was to persuade the Soviets to scrap most of the SS-20s. Ironically, West European leaders no longer embrace the "zero option" once favored by both Reagan and Gorbachev. Having incurred great political risks to get the cruises and Pershings deployed, European governments want to keep at least some as a sign of American determination to protect their countries from attack.

Consequently, the U.S. late last year proposed limiting each side to about 420 warheads on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. But American negotiators in Geneva are now seriously considering the Soviet counteroffer lowering the limit to only 100 warheads apiece in Europe, as long as the Soviets accept certain American conditions. That would require the destruction of 136 U.S. warheads and 1,023 Soviet warheads already deployed, along with the missiles that would launch them. For the first time in arms- control history, an entire class of modern nuclear weapons would be drastically reduced.

Moreover, the Soviets have dropped their insistence that limits on the independent British and French nuclear arsenals be included in any INF bargain. In Washington two weeks ago, Shevardnadze even hinted that Moscow would no longer object to modernization of the British and French nuclear deterrents.

Even so, there are important details that could still frustrate an agreement. Negotiators have yet to determine what mix of U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles would be allowed within the 100-warhead limit. American bargainers want to restrict short-range as well as intermediate Soviet missiles in Europe; Moscow so far is resisting. Further, Washington is seeking a "global" deal that would require destruction of at least 500 out of the 600 warheads now mounted on SS-20s stationed in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. and targeted on Japan or China. (Otherwise, since the missiles are mobile, they could be moved to Europe during a crisis.) Moscow has expressed willingness to consider restrictions on its Asian SS-20s, but has not yet begun talking numbers.

Finally, there is that ancient bugaboo of all U.S.-Soviet arms talks: verification. Even before the INF negotiators at Geneva get around to tackling it, the issue has been causing a split in the Reagan Administration. Pentagon hawks who distrust any kind of arms deal consider "national technical means" (translation: satellites) inadequate to verify whether the Soviets were destroying the warheads that an INF pact forbid them to keep. The hawks are pushing for on-site inspection. The Soviets agreed to some limited inspection of troop movements in Europe as part of a conventional security pact signed in Stockholm with the U.S. and 34 other nations a week ago, and Gorbachev hailed the accord as a model for others. But Pentagon hard-liners are calling for INF verification measures so strict that State Department officials have dubbed them "killer provisions." Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle goes so far as to propose on-site inspections not just of missiles and their launch sites but of the factories that make them. What kind of verification proposal the U.S. will eventually make, let alone whether it will be one that the Soviets might accept, is highly uncertain.

Serious negotiations are under way in Geneva looking toward reducing strategic weapons, the intercontinental monsters that the two superpowers aim directly at each other. But the obstacles to agreement are much greater than in the INF talks. For one thing, START involves many more types of weapons and far more complicated trade-offs. More important, while intermediate-range missiles are a kind of sideshow, the ocean-spanning weapons constitute the core of U.S. and Soviet nuclear might. Possession of them, indeed, is precisely what makes both countries superpowers.

At their summit last November, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed in principle on a goal of cutting the number of strategic weapons in half. But in June, Soviet negotiators at Geneva proposed a reduction of only 30%. The U.S. took this as a sign that the Soviets were being realistic, and Washington is now ready to consider this basic number at least as an interim step. Reagan very nearly said as much publicly in his U.N. speech. Each side currently has approximately 10,000 warheads and bombs; the latest proposals would reduce that figure to 7,500 (U.S. proposal) or 8,000 (Soviet proposal) apiece. But the negotiators have still not agreed on exactly what types of nuclear explosives (ballistic-missile warheads, air-launched cruise-missile warheads, bombs, etc.) are to be counted in the strategic totals. Nor are they anywhere near agreement on the all-important ceilings to be placed on each category of weapon. The Soviets want to set stiff limits on long-range cruise missiles and intercontinental bombers, categories in which the U.S. has an advantage. The U.S. is demanding a reduction of more than 50% in the number of heavy land- based missiles that constitute the backbone of the Soviet arsenal, as well as a sharp reduction in their "throw weight," or power.

The biggest obstacle to any agreement going beyond INF is, as always, Star Wars. The Soviets have given no sign of relenting on their demand that any reduction of offensive strategic weapons be linked to a ban on defensive systems in space. Reagan is equally obstinate in insisting the U.S. will deploy an SDI system if a feasible one can be developed. In his mind, a comprehensive arms-control agreement would involve deep slashes in offensive weapons accompanied by development of space defenses by both superpowers. Only minimal progress has been made in bridging this chasm. Reagan is proposing an extension or renegotiation of the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty that would in effect prevent SDI deployment for as long as 7 1/2 years; the Soviets call for a 15-to-20-year extension, though Gorbachev in his latest letter to Reagan hinted he might accept a shorter term.

Prospects for any comprehensive arms-control deal thus seem dim. But another Reagan-Gorbachev meeting could have considerable value. If it results in an INF accord, that would be a worthwhile accomplishment, both in itself and as a means of getting the superpowers started on the long process of reducing the destructive power of their nuclear forces.

The very fact that Reagan and Gorbachev seem ready for a summit -- and are moving to compromise over Daniloff in order to have one -- is a hopeful sign. It indicates that both have grasped an essential truth of superpower relations: no matter how angry the two nations get at each other -- about Afghanistan, Nicaragua, espionage real or alleged, whatever -- they dare not suspend their efforts to manage the nuclear arms race. Indeed, the more tense relations get, the more important those efforts become.

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With reporting by Johanna McGeary with Shultz and Strobe Talbott/Washington