Nationalism's Silver Lining

By IGOR MALASHENKO Igor Malashenko, 35, is a senior foreign policy analyst for the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. This article represents his personal views.

What is the future of the Soviet Union? Does it have one? And if so, will the U.S.S.R. be able to preserve its integrity and stability?

At the beginning of the 20th century, when traditional empires began to crumble, it seemed that Russia would follow suit. But then, by iron, blood and ideology, the Russian Revolution welded the state together just when it was on the verge of disintegration. The result was what might be called a revolutionary empire.

Seventy-three years later, the revolutionary legacy is fading. The current transition from totalitarianism to democracy has created a dilemma. On the one hand, only democratization can provide the basis for humane, modern political life. On the other hand, democracy by itself cannot keep a multi-national federation together. Quite the contrary: partly because of democratization, centrifugal forces are gathering momentum. As the attempts to democratize post-Tito Yugoslavia have shown, a more powerful antidote is needed to fight the virus of nationalism.

The most ominous feature of the Soviet landscape is the economic crisis. Virtually every republic and region of the country is dissatisfied with its piece of the economic pie, so each tries to protect its own interests any way it can. As long as the economy was growing -- and as long as the old political institutions suppressed any hint of nationalism or regionalism -- the system remained intact. But now the economy is in decline. That fact, combined with democratization, has doomed central planning and exacerbated the centrifugal trends that threaten to tear the country apart.

While the economy today is part of the problem in the U.S.S.R., it could be part of the solution tomorrow. Economic reform and the emergence of market mechanisms may yet help stimulate the economic and political integration of the various parts of the country.

That is the hope. However, it is by no means a certainty. The prospects for economic recovery are bleak. Moreover, even if reform does succeed, it may not outweigh the divisive forces that are now so evident. Politics, after all, is not just a rational accounting of assets and liabilities. All too often, the national aspirations that drive politics take on a wholly irrational character. Even if the central government applies massive and benign economic leverage by offering all sorts of inducements to the republics to stay, it may not deter them from trying to secede.

The best hope for our future depends on rescuing the best of our past -- and on jettisoning the worst. As an imperial power, Russia consolidated under its rule an enormous expanse of territory. Many corners of the empire were conquered in bloody wars. But Russia was also an ethnically and culturally unique country spanning Europe and Asia. It was not only an expansionist power but also a source of security to many small, isolated, exotic peoples and ethnic groups who would otherwise have been at the mercy of hostile neighbors.

Attempts by the Czars to Russify the non-Russian populations always met with resistance. There was never any real danger to the preservation of different national identities. That is why the system was acceptable to most ethnic groups in the past and why Moscow was reasonably successful in containing nationalism. Only when Russia engaged in outright imperialism did it get into serious trouble -- notably during the cold war, when expansionism, primarily in Eastern Europe, threatened the viability of the country.

By deporting whole peoples and destroying their cultures, Stalin greatly damaged the ethnic and cultural diversity that had always been an important part of Russia's strength. The state tried to replace ethnic and cultural differences with a deadening homogeneity. The very name of the country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, carries no hint of ethnic or geographic reality.

If that damage cannot be repaired, we should be prepared for nationalistic chaos in the middle of Eurasia. The results could make the most feared consequences of German unification seem tame by comparison.

Does this mean that a centuries-old great power will inevitably be destroyed by the demons of nationalism? The answer is no. There is not only a grave danger but also a glimpse of hope in the revival of nationalism and regionalism in the Soviet Union. There is a double challenge: economic reform must restore the republics' incentive to stay in the U.S.S.R., while democratization and decentralization reassure their populations that their cultures will be respected and preserved.

The process will be long and painful. There will probably be explosions of violence that may shatter the imperial superstructure. Those parts of the empire that were never integrated into Russia and that are now gravitating toward the West or to the Muslim world may eventually leave. But the rest of the country will not suffer a mortal blow as a result. In fact, quite the contrary: the revival of a Russia shorn of the least compatible remnants of its imperial legacy may encourage the development of a new federation whose diversity is, once again, a source of strength rather than weakness.