Monday, Oct. 07, 1991
First Strike Against the Democrats
By Michael Kramer
By now the seduction is familiar. At about this time in the electoral cycle the polls invariably describe an intriguing dissonance: the President's popularity is high, but many of his policies are deplored. As it was with Ronald Reagan, so it is with George Bush.
In perceiving daylight, the Democrats forget that in politics the whole rarely equals the sum of the parts. The fact that most people are mad about something most of the time does not usually add up to a willingness for change, especially when an incumbent President is seen to have secured the nation's peace during his tenure.
Things are especially weird this time around. In the entire announced and prospective field, not a single Democratic contender has more than a nodding acquaintance with foreign and defense policy. While there is still time to appear credible on these issues, most of those challenging Bush appear comfortable with their collective weakness. None are as vocal about it as Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, who has come to play with his spikes sharpened. But most candidates have bought the notion that the threat of red ink outweighs the threat from Red Square and that a strategy long on domestic prescriptions can turn the trick. Only Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton demurs. "The American people think the country is going in the wrong direction," he says, "but they are not sure that the President can or should do anything about it."
Whether they cannot conjure an alternative course (or perhaps because they simply disagree with Clinton), the Democrats in Congress are preparing to aid their colleagues' White House quest by adopting Mario Cuomo's advice: "Pass a lot of bills that combine to form a Democratic domestic agenda and dare the President to veto them." Thus, reasons Cuomo, the Democrats can both engage Bush and set the terms of discourse.
On the surface, Cuomo's thesis is unassailable, and two likely Democratic initiatives -- health-care legislation and a tax-rate cut for middle-class Americans -- will resonate among voters. But like any other incumbent President, Bush has an almost limitless ability to co-opt the agenda. The Democrats have already been forced to respond to Bush's vision of education reform, and his flip-flop on the issue of extending unemployment benefits proves his political suppleness.
Nothing better illustrates an incumbent's ability to control the debate than Bush's new view of America's nuclear defense posture. In last week's speech, Bush offered a vision at once radical and prudent. No matter that the specifics have been proposed for years; until now no one in a position to take them up has done so. In the process, Bush is likely to trump the opposition's most promising edge: its contention that the world has changed so fundamentally that military expenditures should be redirected to home-front priorities. In the short term -- and perhaps for as long as a decade or more -- Bush's plan might actually inflate defense spending. Nevertheless, as a political matter, the prospect of moving toward a de-nuked world is probably something most people would gladly pay for, and it seems reasonable to assume that a peace dividend will eventually be realized. In any event, none of those who would replace Bush have the stature to credibly challenge the course he has set.
Besides being a textbook case of political co-optation, Bush's program highlights the importance of foreign affairs in elections. In 1988 "about 22% of voters cited foreign and defense policy as their primary concerns," says William Galston, who served as Walter Mondale's issues director. "Almost 80% of those people voted for Bush. It was they who provided Bush's margin of victory, and more will probably vote those concerns in '92 as Bush persuades them that the world is still an unstable place."
Galston and other prominent Democratic campaign strategists like David Sawyer and John Rendon are apoplectic at the sight of the current crop of candidates blithely walking away from foreign policy and defense issues. "Idiocy, pure and simple," says Sawyer. "There are certain tests a prospective President must pass before he can seriously contest the election. Foremost among these is the question of whether a particular candidate is imaginable in the role of Commander in Chief."
To Galston, it is all obvious. "Over the past 60 years," he says, "every President has sent troops in harm's way. The people know that a President's power to get people killed is almost always his alone. Conversely, they know that no President is singly responsible for anything that happens domestically -- good or bad. That's why foreign policy counts for so much." For these consultants, the lesson is basic. "The key is not to concede the territory," says Rendon. "Push all the buttons, make lots and lots of speeches. Try your damnedest to articulate a vision. You have to at least appear to be thinking deeply about these matters."
Representative Stephen Solarz, a New York Democrat, sums it up nicely: "We are not likely to win the '92 election on foreign policy, but we could very easily lose it on foreign policy." So far, the Democrats seem intent on fulfilling Solarz's prophecy. If they do lose the contest, they will not only chalk up their sixth defeat out of seven; they will further solidify their reputation as the party that never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.