Run for the Roses

By PAUL QUINN-JUDGE/MOSCOW

Vladimir Putin is a man possessed. He wants to rebuild a strong Russia with a powerful presidency and a flourishing economy. He is determined to crush separatism in Chechnya or anywhere else within Russia's borders. But first and foremost, he wants to end a decade of deep Russian despair. These are dramatic and ambitious goals but they are not new. Since Peter the Great, Russia's leaders have come to power dreaming of sweeping reforms. Most have ended up disappointed, thwarted by the country's unwieldiness and its bureaucrats' subtle sabotage. Despite Putin's refusal to offer explicit policies and his aides' admission that their programs are not ready to be implemented, expectations are growing that Putin will mark the start of his presidency with a series of dramatic gestures--among them, perhaps, a crackdown on high-level corruption. What is not clear is whether this will be a break with the sleazy Yeltsin past or simply window dressing.

Putin has already made headway in one area: restoring Russians' faith in themselves. His blunt, occasionally coarse style and energetic demeanor have so galvanized the electorate that he is all but a lock to swing into office as President--barring an unexpectedly low turnout or a last-minute erosion of popularity.

But even before the election, Putin has begun quietly dropping hints about how he views the state of affairs in Russia today. He knows it is a mess. He pledges loyalty to the man who gave him power, Boris Yeltsin. But asked recently by two Russian journalists to name his heroes, Putin singled out men who had pulled their countries out of chaos and catastrophe--neither of them Yeltsin. One was Charles de Gaulle, who created a solid, centralized state in France (and quickly pulled his country out of a colonial war in Algeria, a conflict that is often compared with that in Chechnya); the other was Ludwig Erhard, architect of West Germany's postwar economic revival. Putin sees obvious parallels with France of the 1950s and Germany of the late '40s.

Putin studiously avoids defining Yeltsin's legacy but hints broadly in his public appearances that central power under Yeltsin was feeble. Some regional leaders, he claims, "forgot that there was a President." Until he became Prime Minister, Chechnya was handled with "amateurism," he says, and left to fester to the point that it became a deadly danger.

Putin is inheriting a sick country in every sense of the word. Its population declined by 900,000 last year, and male life expectancy, around 60, stands at Third World levels. (Female life expectancy is more than 10 years longer.) Alcohol has killed millions; now an AIDS epidemic seems set to take its toll on both genders. Russia is also beset by other systemic diseases, foremost among them corruption. Few of Russia's 50 richest men could publicly explain how they moved from minor officials to billionaires in half a decade. Several have been investigated for crimes ranging from murder to embezzlement.

The ultimate symbol of state-sponsored corruption and cynical manipulation of power is the Yeltsin "Family." It includes Yeltsin's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko; his onetime chief of staff Valentin Yumashev; and a number of powerful financiers, including Boris Berezovsky. The group played a major role in engineering Yeltsin's retirement and Putin's rise. And though corruption allegations against the Family have disappeared from most front pages, the heat is still on. A Swiss prosecutor recently told a Russian newspaper that relatives and associates of Yeltsin's remain under investigation in his country.

Putin told Ted Koppel on ABC's Nightline last Friday that he was bringing in, as investigators, former KGB colleagues "who are untarnished and have no connection with corruption." Still, the jury is out on the level of Putin's anticorruption zeal. Two prominent members of the Family, Dyachenko and Yumashev, are actively involved in his election campaign. But clouds seem to be thickening over the head of Berezovsky, the most unpopular and pugnacious of the so-called oligarchs. A belief is growing among Russia's political and business elite that Putin wants to destroy Berezovsky's political power. There is less agreement about Putin's motives: Is this the start of a campaign against oligarchs or simply a piece of self-promotion?

Regardless, the first step in the anti-Berezovsky campaign will probably be to undermine his hold on the country's biggest TV network, ORT. Insiders predict that Putin will either cancel ORT's license, which is up for renewal in May, or give its airwaves to the government-controlled RTR network. This will be a blow, and Berezovsky is unlikely to go without a fight. Last year, when then Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov tried to bring Berezovsky up on corruption charges, Yeltsin fired Primakov. Putin, however, will have an advantage that Primakov lacked: he will be President.

In some areas, Putin will probably be predictable. Look for him to move early to push through a constitutional amendment extending the presidential term from four years to seven. This would give him 11 years in power, assuming he's re-elected in 2004. And as President, Putin will be discreetly ruthless in his dealings with opposition-minded political heavyweights. Finally, expect him to continue his rock-hard line on Chechnya. The breakaway republic's warlords do not just want independence, he believes. They want to demolish the Russian Federation. Putin speaks of direct rule over the republic and threatens to "destroy" anyone who takes up arms against Russian rule.

Above all, watch for confusion. Putin's reform plans are not yet ready. German Gref, a longtime Putin associate, says the blueprint for the future of Russia will be ready in April. Another ambitious plan, this time to revamp the country's bureaucracy, is months away. But that is only the start. Invaders are not the only ones who get bogged down in Russia's vast expanses. So do reformers. They are defeated by geography and by the millions of apparatchiks who are masters at blocking, diverting, distorting, delaying and eventually destroying policies they do not like. Reforms aim to transform Russia, notes the country's greatest historian, Vasili Klyuchevsky, but they end up being transformed by Russia. Putin can cut Berezovsky down to size. He can jail oligarchs, scare governors and level Chechen villages. But actually transforming Russia will take more than just political will and cunning. It will also require the kind of good fortune and luck that no modern Russian leader has yet possessed.