How to Fight an Asymmetric War

By General Wesley K. Clark (ret.)

In the darkest moments of our post-Vietnam experience, U.S. Army General Bill DePuy visited Israel. It was right after the 1973 October War, when Israeli forces defeated a series of massed Syrian armor attacks on the Golan Heights. This was a climactic battle, and the victory was close and costly.

Syrians got their equipment and tactics from the Soviet Union. The U.S. Army worked closely with Israel. Together, we saw the need for more powerful tank guns; longer-range, all-weather optics; thicker armor; and better coordination among units. Defensive tactics were refined, complementing Israel's already formidable offensive capabilities. For Israel, it had been the fourth war in 25 years. The Israelis were unchallengeable on the ground and in the air--at least in conventional terms.

So Israel's adversaries found a new way to fight. They used infantry (equipped with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and antitank guided missiles). In response, Israel put mortars on its tanks and practiced seizing the high ground in order to bring fire against enemy infantrymen.

Then the Palestinians inside Israel learned how to resist using nonlethal force, like rocks and clubs. It was a tactic aimed at exploiting world sensitivities, forcing Israeli security forces to overreact. Occasionally the tactics were supplemented by armed men concealed among the rock throwers or by the use of terror bombings. This was the intifadeh.

Israel suddenly saw itself portrayed as Goliath rather than David. Responding with fighter planes, tanks and artillery was impossible; responding with troops on the ground risked casualties; and no society is more reluctant than Israel's to accept losses.

So Israel developed new equipment, new forces and new tactics. To secure its borders, Israel deployed more heavily armored tanks and troop-carrying vehicles. Apache helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and very long-range optics were procured. To protect itself internally, Israel issued its infantrymen plastic bullets and other riot-control gear. Special security forces were organized to help relieve the conventional Israeli units of responsibility for keeping order inside Israel. When confrontation with hostile crowds was unavoidable, Israel used restrictive rules of engagement--and snipers to respond to armed opponents--in an effort to minimize losses and avoid dramatic scenes that could inflame world opinion.

But for every action in military doctrine by one side there is a reaction by the other. And as Palestinians and other Arab states sustained their determination to prevail against Israel, they found legions of men, and even children, willing to take to the streets. Hundreds of educated and well-placed supporters abroad sympathized with them and kept international pressure on Israel.

The capabilities of the two sides, though totally asymmetric, were almost perfectly counterbalanced. And in the peculiar political-military logic of the Middle East, this set the stage for further confrontation.

For Israel, every street battle has to be tactical and defensive, requiring responses aimed at protecting lives and property. For Israel, every casualty, even those among the Palestinians, is a loss. For the Palestinians, every clash is strategic and offensive, increasing the pressure on Israel, building support in the Arab world and, with every Israeli military response, affording the opportunity to further isolate Israel from its liberal, democratic and idealistic supporters. For the Palestinians, every casualty, even their own, can be a strategic gain.

But in this latest round, the Palestinians overreached. The mob violence that resulted in the barbaric murder of two Israeli reservists held in a Palestinian jail was a strategic mistake. Israeli domestic and international opinion swung round again.

Israel's riposte was tactically precise and strategically effective. The pinpoint strikes by armed helicopters on Thursday targeted Palestinian facilities associated with inciting the violence. Carefully giving advance warning to minimize civilian casualties, Israel drew a firm line. Enough. It was sharp and, in Israeli public opinion, satisfying. And as a clear escalation--reminding the world that local events could quickly grow into a major regional conflict--the Israeli move drew in diplomatic leverage from all sides.

But this latest Israeli response is unlikely to be decisive. The continuing struggle will be fought without high-technology ordnance. It will be an effort to prevent the assembling of large, volatile crowds, minimize provocative incidents and gain the intelligence required by sniper teams and elite special forces. The key weapons will be intelligence assets and movement controls. Then it will be up to the police and security forces--and a few expert marksmen. The heavy weaponry will be there, but it will be in backup, a reminder of Israel's determination to defend its people.

General Clark, formerly Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is now an investment banker in Washington with Stephens Inc.