'We're At War'

By Michael Elliott

The deliberate and deadly attacks that were carried out against our country," President Bush said the day after the hijackers turned planes into missiles, "were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war." On cue, by Friday CNN was billing its coverage "America's New War," and Secretary of State Colin Powell was vowing that America would use "all the tools and weapons at our disposal" to fight it.

The rhetoric of war has always come trippingly off the tongue. But as soldiers know, the reality of war is a fog of confusion. And this war may be foggier than most. Nobody knows how to fight a global war against terrorists and those who harbor them--nobody has ever fought such a war before. As officials in Washington scrambled to assess their options last week, they faced questions unknown to their predecessors in high office: Who is our enemy? Where will the war's battlefields be?

To begin answering those puzzles, Bush and Powell last week set to work forging the sort of broad coalition--reaching from traditional allies like Britain to troubled states like Pakistan--that worked so well for George H.W. Bush during the Gulf War. As the week went on, there was a growing conviction in Washington that the U.S. can't win this war alone. "There's no serious unilateral option," said a senior Administration official. "You've got to involve others."

The President handled calls with friends such as the Presidents of France and Italy, and he spoke twice to President Vladimir Putin of Russia. Powell and his staff handled the trickier negotiations. State Department sources tell TIME that the U.S. has asked Pakistan for use of its ports, the plainest indication that Washington intends a substantial military action against Osama bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. Sources also tell TIME that the Administration is considering reaching out to both Libya and Iran for assistance, even though both nations have themselves sponsored terrorism in the past. The State Department, working through diplomatic routes established by Britain and another country, is trying to see if Iran's and Libya's somewhat supportive responses to the bombing can be turned into something concrete. "We are going to smoke them out a little bit on their statements," says a source. Through its intermediaries, the U.S. has conveyed the message to Tehran and Tripoli: "We appreciate what you said. Now what else are you going to do?"

For Powell, who had previously been shut out of the Bush Administration's control room, the crisis has provided the perfect opportunity to put himself at the center of policymaking. He is relishing the task. "The four stars are bulging out of his shoulders," says a State Department official. "Powell doesn't get into conflicts easily. But when he does, he wants to use overwhelming force." At news conferences throughout the week, the Secretary detailed an endless round of diplomacy: the first-ever commitment by NATO to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which considers an attack on one member of the alliance as an attack on all; expressions of solidarity by foreign ministers from Italy to India; a warm letter from President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

Welcome though such support might be, foreign ministers won't be flying the planes or crouching in the foxholes when the first stage of a military campaign against terrorism takes place. And since the states that can be said to harbor terrorism include Syria, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, the broadest conceptions of such a campaign would amount to a third World War. In the short term, any military operations will be more limited in scope. As suspicion hardened in Washington that al-Qaeda ("the base"), the network of terrorists associated with bin Laden, was behind the attacks, plans began to take shape for action against its camps in Afghanistan. At the Pentagon, and at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., home of U.S. Central Command, officers dusted off the options for attacking bin Laden that were first prepared after al-Qaeda operatives bombed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania three years ago.

On that occasion, the Clinton Administration launched cruise-missile strikes on the Afghan camps as well as on an alleged nerve-gas plant in Sudan. The attacks were widely dismissed as doing nothing more than burning a few tents, though a senior Clinton Administration counterterrorism official claims that bin Laden "almost got killed." Whatever happens this time will be a lot bigger--though it will likely fall short of a full-scale invasion. The last army to march successfully through Afghanistan was led by Alexander the Great. In 1842, when a British expeditionary force of 17,000 was forced to retreat from Kabul to Jalalabad, just one man--an army doctor--survived. The Soviet Union's mighty Red Army invaded Afghanistan with tanks and helicopter gunships in 1979; 10 years later, cold and defeated, its troops left the place hoping never to see it again.

But if an invasion is ruled out, substantial military force is not. As soon as the U.S. gathers credible intelligence on bin Laden's whereabouts, expect a combination of air power and special forces on the ground. "I think we'll end up paralyzing a big chunk of Afghanistan with air strikes, and then move rapidly to do a decisive takedown," a U.S. Army general tells TIME. If that is the game, a nighttime blizzard of cruise missiles and bombs would be followed by U.S. commandos--probably including elements of the 82nd Airborne, backed by elite Army Rangers and Delta Force members--all trying to capture or kill bin Laden. "[Bush] won't be taken seriously if he tries to do it all from the air," says an Army officer of his Commander in Chief. "We can do a lot of things with our jets and missiles, but we can't find a specific person. You need boots on the ground to do that."

Getting boots to the right place is easier said than done. For one thing, such an operation doesn't play to the strengths of the U.S. military; 12 years ago, it took 24,000 troops 14 days to find Manuel Noriega in the relatively benign environment of Panama. "We're good at hitting big, immovable things," says an Air Force general. "We don't do so well when they move around and they're small." Both are true of bin Laden. "He is the hardest man ever to get to," says Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism expert at St. Andrews University in Scotland. To avoid being spotted by satellites, bin Laden and his associates use human couriers to relay messages, who sometimes travel on foot rather than in cars. He has been extra careful since Chechen secessionist leader Dzhokar Dudayev was blown up by a Russian rocket while using a satellite phone. Though the CIA has often been criticized for its failure to infiltrate Islamic fundamentalist groups, Ranstorp is more forgiving. "The U.S. has expended as much energy and time as it feasibly could to get close to bin Laden. But he's very well versed in counterintelligence and in how to protect himself."

And even if the special forces get to him, what then? This isn't a case, in the sort of language loved by military folks, in which you just cut off the head of the snake and let the body wither. "Terrorism is not bin Laden," says a senior U.S. intelligence official. "He's got lieutenants waiting to succeed him." The cellular, secretive structure of al-Qaeda--small groups of operatives acting almost independently--militates against a quick, decisive strike. Says Ranstorp: "Al-Qaeda is truly a multinational enterprise; they have made it into a decentralized organization that understands the power of asymmetric warfare in overcoming superpower supremacy."

The international nature of al-Qaeda makes the task of defeating it that much harder. There are thought to be sympathizers and operatives in dozens of countries, all sharing a messianic vision of an Islamic holy war and posing new challenges to the forces of counterterrorism. Many of bin Laden's foot soldiers have combat and logistical experience gained in the Afghan war of 1979-89; indeed, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan turns out to have been one of those events that unexpectedly changes the world. It hastened the demise of the Soviet Union, as poorly trained young Soviet troops got massacred in hostile terrain. It convinced American policymakers, who supported the Afghan resistance, that the U.S. could wage war by proxy, spending treasure but no American blood. And most important, it armed and radicalized a generation of extremists--bin Laden among them--who flocked to Afghanistan from all over the world and who now assist radical Islamic groups from Chechnya to the Philippines and figure out how to crash planes into skyscrapers.

Because terrorists of this new breed are motivated mainly by religious fervor and are part of a global network, they are tough to take out. "Traditional" terrorist groups like the I.R.A. or the Basque group ETA have had distinct nationalist goals; their operatives have been recruited from a relatively small pool, defined by national allegiance, and have often been eventually wooed into mainstream politics. Al-Qaeda is different. On the very fringe of the Islamic world, within which its methods provoke widespread revulsion, its political goal, if it can be said to have one, is the creation of a global Islamic caliphate; it has no interest in conventional politics. And because its motivation is religious rather than nationalistic, it can recruit anywhere from the disaffected among the world's 1 billion Muslims. That's why top-quality surveillance and policing are as much a part of the fight against terrorism as anything armies might do. You can't lob a cruise missile at Delray Beach, Fla., or dispatch a Delta Force squad to Fort Lee, N.J.--though both towns seem to have been home, at least for a while, to some of those who hijacked the planes last week.

With time, however, the U.S. hopes that it can end the tacit assistance that some nations offer terrorists, then eradicate the terror cells themselves. Last week Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke of "removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems" and ending state support for terrorism. Wolfowitz is one of those who have advocated toppling Saddam Hussein in a process of "regime change" in Iraq. The case would be hugely advanced if it could be shown that Saddam was involved in last week's incidents. Was he? Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, says there is "some evidence" that Saddam was involved, evidence that is "credible enough that you can't take Iraq off the list." U.S. intelligence sources tell TIME that, so far, the case against Saddam is vague and thin--a few intelligence reports from southwestern Asia have suggested an Iraqi role in training last week's terrorists--and not strong enough to put Iraq on the target list for immediate retaliation. Yet even if Saddam was involved, changing the Iraqi regime to one more aligned with Western interests would be a tall order. Defense Department sources tell TIME that a classified study has just concluded that absent a long war--of the sort the World War II Allies fought against Germany and Japan--it is almost impossible for a military intervention from outside to impose changes that stick.

Hence early, armed retaliation is likely to be limited to Afghanistan. From 1994 through 1996, the Islamic extremist Taliban moved to fill the power vacuum that had existed since the end of the war. Although the Taliban frequently claims to keep bin Laden in a box, in practice it has defended him. Opposition sources say a brigade of his fighters has been on the front lines in the Taliban's war against the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Massood. (In what may turn out to be an indication of trouble to come, Massood was the victim of a suicide bomber two days before the attacks on New York and Washington. After days of conflicting reports, his death now seems certain.)

The Taliban has many enemies, which gives the U.S. a list of potential friends. Moscow--which supported Massood--hates it for providing aid to Chechen rebels and destabilizing Tajikistan, whose hard-pressed armed forces are assisted by Russian ones. China is worried that Muslim Uighur separatists are being trained in Afghan camps. India is desperate to stop the flow to Kashmir of fighters trained by bin Laden. Iran, a nation of Shi'ite Muslims, detests the Taliban because it consists of Sunni extremists; moreover, Tehran has to deal both with Afghan refugees and with drug runners who have been fighting a low-level war with Iranian border guards. Iran itself has a history of sponsoring terrorism in the Middle East, and although its intelligence ministry is under the control of reformist President Mohammed Khatami, the security apparatus is not. But the government condemned last week's attacks in the U.S. (it was silent after the African embassy bombings in 1998). Says a senior Administration official: "The U.S. and Iran obviously have something of a common enemy in the Taliban," while another confirms that there are "openings" to Tehran.

Of late, the Taliban's major support has come from Pakistan, a self-declared Islamic republic in which Islamic radicals--who want to end Indian rule in Kashmir--have become increasingly influential. On roads in northwestern Pakistan that border Afghanistan, signs advertise training camps run by jihadis: FIGHT IN THE WAY OF ALLAH, FREE COMMANDO TRAINING. Any substantial action against Afghanistan would need Pakistani cooperation. That's why the crucial meeting last week was between Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Mahmoud Ahmad, the head of the powerful Pakistani InterServices Intelligence department, who was visiting Washington. A senior Administration official says Armitage gave Ahmad a set of demands that were "eyeball peeling," including the rights to overfly Pakistan's territory (important if the U.S. is to use the two aircraft carriers it has in the region), a full exchange of intelligence and the use of its ports. "You're either 100% with us or 100% against us," said Armitage, according to the senior official.

In Islamabad, top military and intelligence officials in the government of President Pervez Musharraf held a series of intense meetings. They sized up their options and decided to throw in their lot with the Americans, despite concerns over the reaction on the street. Pakistani officials, sources say, realized that the U.S. action against bin Laden was likely to be "massive and indiscriminate" and saw little reason that their own nation should want to be collateral damage. Musharraf, said Rifaat Hussain, a defense expert at an Islamabad university, "can either swim with the international current or sink with the Taliban." The decision to back the U.S., sources say, was made easier by a growing Pakistani frustration with the Taliban. Islamabad supported the regime hoping that it would bring peace and stability to the region, but the war with the Northern Alliance continues, as does a destabilizing flow of refugees and arms.

The Taliban leadership sounds rattled. Toward the end of last week, it threatened war against any country that helped the U.S. mount an attack. Bush, for his part, needs to be realistic about the cohesion of any new coalition. Negotiations with the Russians start next week, though Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has already ruled out the use of central Asian territory by "NATO military operations." Told that Pakistan has signed on to the coalition, Bush commented, "I appreciate that statement, and now we'll just find out what that means, won't we?" Islamabad will certainly try to exact a price for its cooperation, especially some relief from the economic sanctions imposed after it tested nuclear devices in 1998. Arab states asked to join the coalition will doubtless request some guarantee that the U.S. will kick-start the stalled peace process in the Middle East. In the short term, that is not in the cards; it would look too much like a reward to Israel's enemies. But in the end, finding a lasting peace in the Middle East may be a prerequisite to winning the new war.

Experts in terrorism the world over, though, stress the limits of a purely military approach. The application of massive firepower has not ended terrorism in Chechnya or in the West Bank, notes Paul Wilkinson, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism at St. Andrews. Adds Wilkinson: "Even a superpower can't do it on its own." Analysts stress a long-term policy of "draining the swamp," ameliorating the sources of terrorism while removing their support. In the case of Islamic radicalism, such an approach could involve economic assistance to a post-Taliban Afghanistan, a place so wrecked at present that any new military action would just make the rubble bounce some more. It would require a concerted effort to reach out to those many moderate Islamic clerics who detest terrorism, coupled with a determination to shut down financial support for terrorist networks. Already Washington has told the Saudi government that the U.S. will no longer tolerate the practice of turning a blind eye to wealthy Saudis who fund extremist groups. "We're not going to pussyfoot around with them," says a senior State Department official.

In the next few weeks and months, the rustle of papers that suggest such quiet initiatives will be drowned by the drumbeats of war. How loud and how long those drums tap out their rhythm of yet more death and destruction remains--like so much about our new war--hidden in the fog.

--With reporting by Hannah Bloch/Kabul; Massimo Calabresi, Mark Thompson and Douglas Waller/Washington; Michael Fathers and Meenakshi Ganguly/New Delhi; James Graff/Brussels; Ghulam Hasnain/Islamabad; Scott MacLeod and Amany Radwan/Cairo; J.F.O. McAllister and Romesh Ratnesar/London; Azadeh Moaveni/Tehran; Paul Quinn-Judge/Moscow and Matt Rees/Jerusalem

With reporting by Hannah Bloch/Kabul; Massimo Calabresi, Mark Thompson and Douglas Waller/Washington; Michael Fathers and Meenakshi Ganguly/New Delhi; James Graff/Brussels; Ghulam Hasnain/Islamabad; Scott MacLeod and Amany Radwan/ Cairo; J.F.O. McAllister and Romesh Ratne